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 The idea of using law to change the built environment in ways that reduce 
opportunities to commit crimes has a long history. Unfortunately, this idea has 
received relatively little attention in the legal academy and only limited rigorous 
empirical scrutiny. In this Article, we review the considerable literature on the 
relationship between zoning, the built environment, and crime. We then report the 
results of two empirical studies on these relationships. First, we conducted a study of 
the effect of zoning on crime using 205 blocks selected in eight different relatively 
high crime neighborhoods in Los Angeles that have similar demographic character-
istics but different forms of zoned land use. We find that mixed commercial- and 
residential-zoned areas are associated with lower crime than are commercial-only 
zoned areas. Second, we matched neighborhoods undergoing zoning changes between 
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2006 and 2010 with neighborhoods that underwent no zoning changes during this 
period but had similar preexisting crime trajectories between 1994 and 2005. The 
primary zoning change in these neighborhoods was to convert parcels to residential 
uses. We find that neighborhoods in which there was a zoning change experienced a 
significant decline in crime. Our results suggest that mixing residential-only zoning 
into commercial blocks may be a promising means of reducing crime.  
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It is likewise commanded that the highways from market towns to other 
market towns be widened where there are woods or hedges or ditches, so 
that there be no ditch, underwood or bushes where one could hide with evil 
intent within two hundred feet of the road on one side or the other 
side . . . . And if perchance there is a park near the highway, it will behove 
the lord of the park to reduce his park until there is a verge two hundred 
foot wide at the side of the highway, as aforesaid, or to make a wall, ditch or 
hedge that malefactors cannot get over or get back over to do evil. 
—King Edward I, Statute of Winchester, 12851 
INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers have long sought to use law to shape the physical envi-
ronment to reduce crime. Such efforts date at least as far back as the Statute 
of Winchester in 1285, in which King Edward I required the widening of 
highways and removal of bushes that provided cover to robbers.2 More 
recently, legal academics have proposed that land use law should be used by 
policymakers to reduce crime.3  
The attraction of such a strategy is considerable. Traditionally, criminal 
law has sought to reduce crime by deterring, rehabilitating, or incapacitating 
 
1 Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 5 (Eng.), reprinted in 3 ENGLISH HISTORICAL 
DOCUMENTS 1189–1327, at 461 (Harry Rothwell ed., 1975). 
2 For a discussion of these provisions of the statute and their antecedents, see Henry Sum-
merson, The Enforcement of the Statute of Winchester, 1285–1327, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 232, 233 (1992). 
3 See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND 
THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 101-11 (2010) (describing the various “land-management 
strategies” that city officials have used to combat crime as an alternative to policing, such as 
“homeless campuses, ‘neighborhood exclusion zones,’ and regulatory ‘sweeps’”); Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) [hereinafter Garnett, 
Ordering] (“[G]overnment choices about the uses of property also dramatically affect [the order-
maintenance of order within] an urban environment without raising the same constitutional 
concerns [as] police discretion.”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 
43, 47 [hereinafter Garnett, The People Paradox] (arguing that mixed–land use urban development 
may be justified because people feel safer in busier neighborhoods, despite evidence that 
commercial activity is associated with crime). See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as 
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002); Edward H. Ziegler, American Cities, Urban Planning, and 
Place-Based Crime Prevention, 39 URB. LAW. 859, 869-73 (2007) (reviewing the typical processes by 
which cities implement place-based crime control efforts). 
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potential criminals, but it has taken little account of spatial or situational 
factors.4 Unfortunately, this approach has sometimes proved disappointing 
in practice. For example, sentencing reforms that emphasized deterrence 
through the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences5 have shown little 
relationship with actual crime trends.6 Meanwhile, rehabilitation efforts 
have been abandoned for many adult offenders in the United States.7 
Incapacitation is expensive, has limited effects on crime, and imposes other 
substantial social costs.8 Most crimes are not even reported, much less solved, 
again limiting the efficacy of the conventional criminal law in reducing crime.9  
 
4 See Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 837 (2010) 
(noting that western criminal law “tend[s] to focus on dispositional factors at the expense of more 
critical situational factors” when seeking to understand criminal events, rather than important 
physical-spatial elements). 
5 JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 133-37 (rev. ed. 1983). 
6 Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of  
Consistent Findings, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 65, 68-69 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 2009). But see Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Does Three Strikes Deter?: A Non-
parametric Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 309, 326-28 (2007) (finding that California’s three-
strikes law has a significant deterrent effect among criminals with two strikes). 
7 See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF 
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 38-40 (2006) (tracing how dissatisfaction with sentencing 
practices gradually led to the abandonment of rehabilitation as a goal). 
8 See WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION 220-21 (1994) (finding that inca-
pacitation has a -0.20 elasticity with regards to crime, suggesting that a 10% increase in incarcera-
tion produces a 2% decrease in crime); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, 
INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 74-75 (1995) (finding 
little evidence of crime reductions from incapacitation given the overall diversity of offending, the 
relatively low probability of apprehension and conviction upon arrest, and the replacement 
population of offending); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Jr., Prison Population Growth 
and Crime Reduction, 10 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 109, 129-33 (1994) (using state-level 
differences in incarceration rates over time to calculate a -0.16 elasticity of incarceration on crime); 
see also Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison 
Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 323-24 (1996) (demonstrating a larger incapacitation 
effect of -0.30 elasticity for property crimes and -0.40 for violent crimes after controlling for 
simultaneity bias by using shifts in prison populations following successful prison overcrowding 
litigation). However, these larger effects are only true for the relative shift in people actually 
sentenced to prison, not on all motivated offenders, which is likely much lower. See Rucker 
Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & 
ECON. 273, 302 (2012) (finding a much smaller crime-reduction effect for recent increases in 
incarceration rates). 
9 See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
231327, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009, at 1 (2010) (noting that only about half of all violent 
crimes and two-fifths of all property crimes were reported to the police); FBI, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2009, at tbl.25 (2010), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_ 
25.html (showing less than a fifty-percent clearance rate by arrest for violent crimes by federal 
agencies).  
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Using land use law to reduce crime sidesteps both of these problems and 
also the overworked criminal justice system.10 By shaping the built envi-
ronment, policymakers can theoretically eliminate crime by design.11  
This idea has received considerably more attention in the urban plan-
ning literature than in legal scholarship. Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities noted the importance of the built environment on 
crime rates and argued for development policies that encouraged diverse 
land uses to create a vital urban environment and encourage “eyes on the 
street”12 to deter crime.13 In 1968, Shlomo Angel proposed reducing crime 
though design.14 In 1971, C. Ray Jeffery published Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design,15 which was followed by Oscar Newman’s publication 
 
10 Many of the hypothesized mechanisms used by land use law are related to deterrence and 
incapacitation but on a more local level. Land use law that attempts to reduce crime by increasing 
visibility is a form of localized deterrence. Similarly, “target hardening” anti-crime measures are a 
form of local incapacitation that keep criminals out of certain areas, rather than confining them to 
prisons. This is also related to what has been called “third-party policing.” See Michael E. Buerger 
& Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Third-Party Policing: A Theoretical Analysis of an Emerging Trend, 15 
JUST. Q. 301, 301-03 (1998) (defining third-party policing as providing incentives to, or coercing, 
nonoffenders, especially guardians of property where lawlessness may occur—like bar owners and 
landlords—to take actions which are outside the scope of their routine activities and which are 
designed indirectly to minimize disorder and thereby reduce crime); Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining 
Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 969-70 (noting problems with the existing enforcement 
paradigm of criminal justice and calling for situational crime prevention as a key goal of any 
criminal justice system). 
11 Early–twentieth century criminologists also focused on the role of the built environment 
on crime. See, e.g., ROBERT E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY 25 (1925) (claiming that the design of 
cities affects social interaction, which in turn affects crime); Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, 
44 AM. J. SOC. 1, 16 (1938) (“The necessary frequent movement of great numbers of individuals 
in a congested habitat gives occasion to friction and irritation.”). For earlier studies that focused 
on the role of geography as a causal factor in crime, see M.A. QUETELET, A TREATISE ON 
MAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS FACULTIES 84-90 (Edinburgh, William & Robert 
Chambers 1842). See also John Glyde, Jr., Localities of Crime in Suffolk, 19 J. STAT. SOC’Y LONDON 
102, 103 (1856) (comparing relatively higher crime levels in towns “where labourers aggregate 
together” to lower rates in rural districts). 
12 The phrase as originally written was “eyes upon the street.” JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH 
AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35 (1961). However, most subsequent commentary 
uses “eyes on the street.” See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 3, at 1050. We use this more popular version 
throughout this Article. 
13 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 35-36. Even prior to Jacobs’s work, University of Chicago sociolo-
gists focused on the importance of spatial relationships in understanding crime. See, e.g., 
CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS 
315 (1942) (noting that rates of delinquency remained relatively constant in certain areas of 
Chicago despite demographic changes). 
14 See Shlomo Angel, Discouraging Crime Through City Planning 7-15 (Ctr. for Planning & Dev. 
Research, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Working Paper No. 75, 1968) (recognizing that “manipulation of 
the physical environment” can reduce the “number and intensity of criminal opportunities”). 
15 C. RAY JEFFERY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (1971). 
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of the influential Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design in 
1972.16 The field of public health has also begun to pay increased attention to 
the way in which the design of communities affects a wide array of health 
outcomes, including violent crime.17 
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of this idea, and a profusion of 
many ostensibly plausible theories about the interrelationship between land 
use law, the built environment, and crime, there has been relatively limited 
high-quality empirical research on the topic generally and almost no 
empirical research on this topic in the legal academy specifically. Only 
recently have legal scholars considered the relationship between the built 
environment and crime, as well as the opportunities to shape the built 
environment through land use regulation.18 Even so, discussions of this 
topic have remained speculative at best and have not faced rigorous empirical 
tests, due in part to the unavailability of micro-level data on both land use 
regulation and crime patterns. 
In this Article, we examine the relationship between zoning, the built 
environment, and crime by testing a variety of hypotheses suggested by the 
previous literatures on this subject. We take advantage of the detailed 
block-level crime data of Los Angeles and the systematic social observations 
 
16 OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN 
DESIGN (1972). Other authors of this era also suggested a connection between the physical 
environment and crime. See, e.g., RICHARD A. GARDINER, DESIGN FOR SAFE NEIGHBOR-
HOODS 4 (1978) (arguing that redesign of the physical environment is an important and 
overlooked crime-prevention tool); Stephanie W. Greenberg et al., Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: 
A Comparison of Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime 
Neighborhoods, 5 POPULATION & ENV’T 141, 161 (1982) (concluding that differences in the built 
environment distinguish between high- and low-crime neighborhoods even more than differences 
in informal territorial control). 
17 See, e.g., RICHARD J. JACKSON & STACY SINCLAIR, DESIGNING HEALTHY COMMU-
NITIES 35 (2012) (arguing that a root cause of many public health problems is the design of the 
physical environment); William C. Sullivan & Chun-Yen Chang, Mental Health and the Built 
Environment (discussing the health consequences of living in a violent neighborhood and the 
prospect of deterring crime through design), in MAKING HEALTHY PLACES: DESIGNING AND 
BUILDING FOR HEALTH, WELL-BEING, AND SUSTAINABILITY 106, 113 (Andrew L. Dannenberg et 
al. eds., 2011); Deborah A. Cohen et al., The Built Environment and Collective Efficacy, 14 HEALTH 
& PLACE 198, 205 (2008) (finding that parks were positively associated with the collective efficacy 
of neighborhoods); Julie Samia Mair & Michael Mair, Violence Prevention and Control Through 
Environmental Modifications, 24 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 209, 211-21 (2003) (reviewing research 
on the connection between the built environment and crime). 
18 See Garnett, Ordering, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the role of property regulation in  
order-maintenance policing); Katyal, supra note 3, at 1090-1127 (noting and discussing opportunities 
for the government to reduce crime through architecture); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling 
Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 
1165, 1171-72 (1996) (recognizing the relationship between open-access public spaces, public order, 
and crime, and positing that zoning should be used for public lands to maintain street order).  
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conducted on 205 blocks in eight relatively high-crime areas of Los Angeles. 
We supplement this data with a Los Angeles-wide analysis of the relation-
ship between changes in land use zones and crime in neighborhoods.  
We focus on relatively high-crime neighborhoods because of the pressing 
policy need to reduce crime in such distressed areas. Using Los Angeles as 
our study site also complements the limited existing literature on the effect 
of land use on crime—a literature that mostly focuses on older cities with a 
different pattern of development.19 An important improvement over previous 
research is that we were able to use a stronger research design20 and discuss 
ways the regulatory framework around land use can be used to reduce crime. 
Our central finding is that blocks that include both residential and 
commercial zoning exhibit less crime than blocks that are zoned exclusively 
for commercial use. This result suggests that including some parcels with 
residential-only zoning on blocks that are otherwise zoned commercially 
might reduce crime. We also find that crime rates are lowest in residential-
only blocks, even in relatively high-crime neighborhoods. Finally, we find 
that when neighborhoods undergo some change in zoning—mostly toward 
residential forms—crime drops more than it does in neighborhoods that had 
comparable crime trends prior to the zoning change that occurred.  
We organize this Article by first providing background about land use 
law and Los Angeles before turning to a review of the sizable literatures in 
criminology and urban planning that address the relationship between the 
built environment and crime. We then recount our results and conclude 
with implications for policymakers. 
 I. BACKGROUND ON LAND USE LAW, THE BUILT  
ENVIRONMENT, AND CRIME 
Land Use law, zoning, and the built environment are related yet distinct 
concepts. Zoning is one example of land use law, which also includes 
building and housing codes. Zoning typically prohibits or permits certain 
uses of property. A property may be zoned for some particular use or uses 
and yet remain vacant. Land use is how a particular parcel is in fact used. 
The built environment refers to what is actually present on the land and can 
include not just the building but also the sidewalk and the distance from the 
 
19 Los Angeles differs from eastern cities in its density pattern. Instead of having a very 
dense urban core surrounded by less-dense suburbs, the density of Los Angeles is spread more 
evenly. ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 65 (2005). 
20 Past research in this area has typically used relatively small samples and very simple cross-
sectional designs. We use a more sophisticated matching strategy that overcomes some of the 
limitations in the earlier research. For further discussion of these issues, see infra, Parts III & IV. 
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building to the street—in other words, the whole constructed physical 
environment. The built environment is often closely connected to social 
aspects of the environment, including signs of physical decay and disorder.  
 A. The Development of Land Use and Planning Law 
While the common law has long addressed issues of land use,21 an  
important milestone in the development of modern land use and planning 
law occurred in 1909, when the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
authority of Boston to create differential height districts in Welch v.  
Swasey.22 Later that same year, the City of Los Angeles divided itself into 
industrial and residential districts; it also banned industrial activities within 
residential districts.23 Finally, the First National City Planning Conference 
was held in Washington, D.C., that same year. Adherents of planning, 
including Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., advocated the use of “land use 
districting,” as zoning was then known.24 
Building on these antecedents, New York City is generally credited with 
enacting the first modern zoning ordinance in 1916.25 By 1921, nearly half of 
the states had passed zoning-enabling acts, which allowed municipalities 
within those states to pass zoning ordinances.26 By 1926, 564 municipalities 
 
21 Nuisance law, for example, was often concerned with inconsistent uses of land. See 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *402-03 (“If my neighbour makes a tan-yard, so as to annoy 
and render less salubrious the air of my house or gardens, the law will furnish me with a reme-
dy.”). For an interesting discussion of nuisance law as a combination of an exclusion regime and 
tort-like governance rules, see generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of 
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1046 (2004). Restrictive covenants and easements were two other 
means by which the common law addressed land use issues. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to 
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 779-81 
(1973) (criticizing zoning as generally creating more problems than it solves and proposing the use 
of restrictive covenants, nuisance rules (promulgated by “Nuisance Boards”), and fines as a 
superior alternative approach to “achieving the fundamental goals of a land use control system—
efficiency and equity”). 
22 214 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1909). Even prior to 1909, cities used fire limits, building codes, and 
single-purpose districting in an effort to address growth-related problems. See Kathy A. Kolnick, 
Order Before Zoning: Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles 1880–1915, at 5 (May 2008) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California), available at http://books.google.com/books/ 
about/Order_Before_Zoning_Land_Use_Regulation.html?id=HHMj3AOyoqMC (noting that local 
regulations governing land use proliferated across the country prior to 1916).  
23 The United States Supreme Court upheld this action when it was challenged as a violation 
of the Constitution in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412-14 (1915). 
24 Kolnick, supra note 22, at 18. 
25 JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 23 (2d ed. 2007). 
26 Id. 
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had passed such ordinances.27 Property owners, however, challenged zoning 
as a restriction on their rights to control their property. The United States 
Supreme Court largely resolved lingering concerns over the constitutionality 
of zoning when it upheld zoning as a valid use of the police power in Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.28 
Exclusionary zoning was popular because it could protect existing resi-
dential land uses.29 Particularly in an era in which unsightly, pollution- and 
noise-generating industry made up a much higher proportion of urban 
employment, the merits of separating industrial from residential sections of 
the city seemed self-evident. As James Metzenbaum, the attorney for the 
Village of Euclid, successfully argued, zoning is “good housekeeping” that 
results in improvements in community health, safety, and general welfare.30 
Zoning reformers argued that zoning promoted the single-family home 
and the domestic life with which it was associated.31 Proponents believed 
that commercial activity facilitated crime and should take place outside 
residential areas. The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “[a] place of 
business in a residence neighborhood furnishes an excuse for any criminal to 
go into the neighborhood, where, otherwise, a stranger would be under the 
ban of suspicion.”32 Similarly, the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga 
 
27 Id. at 24. 
28 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  
29 See GARNETT, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that zoning “guaranteed stable property values 
and tax revenues” and “empower[ed] local governments to exclude unwanted land uses”); William 
A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 
321 (2004) (arguing that the advent of motorized trucks around 1905 promoted the decentralization 
of industry and its movement away from city centers, which increased the use of zoning to protect 
suburban residential neighborhoods); Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willow: Patterns of 
Land Use Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870–1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 634 (1991) 
(discussing the adoption of zoning in New Haven, Connecticut, as a response to homeowners’ 
fears about the inadequacy of pre-zoning land use agreements “in the face of large-scale demo-
graphic and technological change”).  
30 1 JAMES METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 60-62 (2d ed. 1955). The disadvantages 
of zoning were recognized by the first judge to consider the constitutionality of zoning, who noted 
that communities could group “the population and segregate them according to their income or 
situation in life.” Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 
272 U.S. 365. While zoning was popular, it did not typically include comprehensive planning, such 
as planning for public transit, streets, parks, or the future growth of the city. See JUERGENSMEYER & 
ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 24-26 (discussing how zoning became more popular than, and 
eventually displaced, comprehensive planning). 
31 See Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 386-87 (Cal. 1925) (“[R]esidential zoning may, 
in the last analysis, be rested upon the protection of the civic and social values of the American 
home . . . . and the fostering of home life doubtless tends to the enhancement, not only of 
community life, but of the life of the nation as a whole.”). 
32 State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923); see also  
GARNETT, supra note 3, at 39 (citing an argument by a zoning proponent that “by segregating  
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County, Ohio, noted that “[t]he number of people passing in and out [of 
mixed-use districts] render immoral practices therein more difficult of 
detection and suppression.”33 
While it might seem odd today, the mixture of residential and commercial 
uses was considered almost self-evidently undesirable.34 Take, for example, 
the Ohio Supreme Court’s explanation of the justifications for zoning: “The 
entrance of business blocks into a residence district tends to ‘blight’ the 
district and gradually to invite therein the hazards, both physical and moral, 
which exist in the sections which combine business with home life.”35  
In 1961, Jane Jacobs published The Death and Life of Great American  
Cities, a blistering critique of the conventional planning wisdom of the day, 
which she argued was as unscientific as bloodletting in the history of medi-
cine.36 Her central argument was that a healthy big-city street has multiple 
simultaneous uses and that efforts to geographically organize the city into 
single-purpose uses are profoundly misguided, regardless of whether the 
organization results from large-scale redevelopment or conventional 
exclusionary zoning.37 
More recently, there have been attempts to update zoning to encourage 
more nuanced development patterns under the general banner of New 
Urbanism. In 1994, the American Planning Association began to update 
standard planning- and zoning-enabling acts in their Growing Smart 
Project and published exemplar growth codes, which included mixed-use 
developments, town centers, affordable housing, transferable development 
rights, and pedestrian overlay districts.38  
In general, there has been a partial shift from use-based codes to form-
based codes, as well as an increasing effort to reduce sprawl and encourage 
more urban “in-fill” development.39 The touted benefits of such development 
 
residential and commercial land uses, zoning could minimize . . . the ‘negative social-influence 
effects’ of urban life,” and noting the subtext of Social Darwinist arguments).  
33 State ex rel. Morris v. City of East Cleveland, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 549, 554-55 (C.P. 
Cuyahoga County 1920). 
34 Part of this change in understanding may be explained by the evolution of the typical 
commercial establishment. Today, we might think of a Starbucks or a boutique. In that era, the 
fishmonger, butcher, or similar occupations that involved substantial local negative externalities 
might have come immediately to mind. 
35 Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, 35 (Ohio 1925), overruled on other grounds, Village of Hudson 
v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984).  
36 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 12. 
37 Id. at 152-77 (explaining that a mixture of residential and commercial uses in a city  
improves economic prosperity). 
38 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 62. 
39 See, e.g., ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SMARTCODE & MANUAL C1, C16 (2006) (arguing 
for the adoption of the SmartCode, a form-based code that “encourages a certain physical  
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include less reliance on the automobile, less time spent commuting, less 
pollution, less need for unsightly parking lots, more exercise,40 a reduced 
environmental impact41 and, notably for our purposes, less crime.42  
Others have leveled a broader critique at zoning itself and suggested 
that zoning laws prevent the patterns of mixed use development that are 
“an essential element in the[] stability and vitality” of poor neighbor-
hoods.43 One defender of a no-zoning regime noted that “[t]he ability to 
establish a business in one’s garage or home contributes to easy entry of 
individuals into the economic system.”44 Similarly, Garnett has suggested 
that, in low-income neighborhoods, “the addition of a new bodega, hair-
braiding salon, or auto repair business might lead to less disorder, not more, 
by generating the foot traffic that Jacobs and the new urbanists argue fosters 
healthy and safe street life.”45  
 B. History of Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles 
Turning to our study site, Los Angeles has a long history of zoning classi-
fications that regulate land use. The history of land use regulation in Los 
Angeles began in 1573, when Philip II of Spain issued the Laws of the 
Indies, which governed the establishment of cities in Spanish America, 
including Los Angeles.46 The code included detailed instructions for the 
 
outcome,” in order to “establish a human habitat that promotes the health, safety and welfare of 
the community, while conserving land and resources”); Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street 
Legal Again: The SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71 MO. L. REV. 637, 638-45 (2006) (asserting that 
“use-based zoning ordinances are now one of the leading factors in inducing . . . sprawl” and that 
the SmartCode is replacing these use-based codes). 
40 See Brian E. Saelens et al., Environmental Correlates of Walking and Cycling: Findings From 
the Transportation, Urban Design, and Planning Literatures, 25 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 80, 83 (2003) 
(finding that residents in areas with higher density, greater street connectivity, and more mixed 
land use tend to walk and ride bicycles more often for transportation purposes). 
41 See CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, CHARTER OF THE NEW URBANISM, 
(2001), available at http://www.cnu.org/sites/files/charter_english.pdf (recognizing that environ-
mental health cannot be “sustained without a coherent and supportive physical environment”). 
42 RICHARD H. SCHNEIDER & TED KITCHEN, CRIME PREVENTION AND THE BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT 45, 52-53 (2007) (noting New Urbanism’s claims of crime reduction and the lack 
of evidence supporting them). 
43 STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 56 (1981). 
44 Id.  
45 Nicole Garnett, Ordering, supra note 3, at 42; see also id. at 5 (examining arguments that the 
“prevailing system of land use regulation—zoning—may devastate city neighborhoods by stifling 
the entrepreneurial energies of inner-city residents and precluding the diversity of uses needed for 
a healthy street life”). 
46 John W. Reps, The Future of American Planning—Requiem or Renascence?, in LAND USE 
CONTROLS: Q. REV., no. 2, 1967, at 1, 1-16; see also Axel I. Mundigo & Dora P. Crouch, The City  
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location of “slaughter houses, fisheries, tanneries, and other businesses 
which produce filth.”47 Similarly, these laws required the construction of 
arcades around the central plaza, “for these are of considerable convenience 
to the merchants who generally gather there.”48 In the 1880s, modern land 
use regulation began when Los Angeles and San Francisco passed ordinances 
regulating the location of laundries.49 By 1915, Los Angeles was zoned into a 
large residential district, twenty-seven industrial districts, and about one-
hundred “residence exception districts,” which permitted most uses.50 In 
California, as elsewhere, the promotion and protection of the single-family 
zone was critical. As the California Supreme Court explained, in affirming 
the exclusion of multi-family buildings from a single-family zone: 
The establishment of such districts is for the general welfare because it 
tends to promote and perpetuate the American home. . . . The character 
and quality of manhood and womanhood are in a large measure the result of 
home environment. . . . [A] single family home [is] more desirable for the 
promotion and perpetuation of family life than an apartment, hotel, or flat.51 
This protection of the single-family home was consistent with the perceived 
purpose of exclusionary zoning throughout the nation.52 
The current Los Angeles zoning ordinance includes a blizzard of classifi-
cations: twenty-five separate parcel-level residential zoning codes, seven 
commercial zones, five manufacturing zones, and two special parking 
zones.53 Each of these has additional height districts that restrict both the 
absolute height54 of the building and the floor area ratio (FAR).55 In addition, 
 
Planning Ordinances of the Laws of the Indies Revisited, Part 1: Their Philosophy and Implications, 48 
TOWN PLAN. REV. 247, 248 (1977). 
47 Mundigo & Crouch, supra note 46, at 255. 
48 Id. 
49 NAT’L COMM’N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 91-34, at 200 (1st Sess. 1968). 
50 Id. at 200 n.6. 
51 Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 386-87 (Cal. 1925). 
52 See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. 
53 L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. I, § 12.04 (2012), available at http://www.amlegal. 
com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&Fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:lapz_ca. “Zoning” can refer to 
one of three things: “macro”-level issues (e.g., “That section of the city is zoned for industry”), 
micro-level issues (e.g., “This parcel is zoned for commercial use”), or issues somewhere in-
between (e.g., “That block is commercially zoned”). Thus, while multiple city blocks can be 
classified within the same zone, zoning operates at the parcel-level. Somewhat confusingly, 
“mixed-use zoning” is not, in fact a specific kind of zone in Los Angeles; rather it refers to the 
practice of having multiple kinds of zones in close proximity. This was considered undesirable in 
traditional zoning practice which generally sought to segregate residential uses from other uses.  
54 Id. § 12.21.1. 
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there are supplemental-use districts that regulate uses such as oil drilling, 
animal slaughtering, and surface mining.56 
II. EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
 LAND USE, THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT, AND CRIME 
Despite occasional suggestions that land use regulation could be an  
important tool in reducing crime, existing research generally has not 
identified specific modifications to the built environment that can effectively 
reduce crime and violence. While no shortage of plausible hypotheses exist 
about the relationship between land use, the built environment, and crime, 
there is little high quality empirical research investigating many of these 
relationships.  
In this Part, we review more mechanisms by which land use and the 
built environment might affect crime and assess the empirical evidence 
supporting them. For analytic purposes, we divide these mechanisms into 
Land Use, Natural Surveillance, Target Hardening, Territoriality and 
Permeability, Physical Disorder, Crime Attractors/Reducers, and Density. 
The mechanisms are often related, so any effort to categorize them is 
somewhat unsatisfactory. For example, one of the reasons that territoriality 
is important is because it seems to enhance natural surveillance. Yet, as is 
sometimes the case in an interdisciplinary literature review, different disci-
plines (in this case, urban planning and criminology) take different approaches 
to the same (or very similar) underlying issues. Despite that caveat, it seems 
useful for analytic purposes to divide the numerous studies into these groups.  
 A. Land Use 
While there has been little research on the effect of zoning on crime,57 
there has been considerable research on the related issue of the effect of 
different kinds of land use on crime. In general, research has concluded that, 
contrary to Jane Jacobs’s suggestion,58 commercial uses are associated with 
 
55 Id. The floor area ratio (FAR) is the ratio of total floor area of buildings to the size of the 
land. In most of Los Angeles, the permitted ratios range from as low as 1.5:1 to a maximum of 13:1. 
Id. § 14.5.3. 
56 Id. § 12.04. 
57 But see ADELE V. HARRELL & CATERINA GOUVIS ROMAN, COMMUNITY DECAY 
AND CRIME: ISSUES FOR POLICY RESEARCH 18-20 (1994) (finding that the percentage of lots 
zoned for commercial use was associated with an increased risk of robbery). 
58 See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 36-37 (theorizing that commercial uses sprinkled among 
residential areas increase safety because “storekeepers and other small business[people] are 
typically strong proponents of peace and order themselves” and because increased foot traffic to 
the commercial uses increases surveillance in the area). 
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increased rather than decreased crime.59 Similarly, considerable research on 
this issue has shown that homogeneous residential neighborhoods have 
lower rates of crime than mixed-use neighborhoods.60 
What explains the findings that commercial land use is generally associ-
ated with more crime? Or, more generally, why does the built environment 
seem to make a difference? We turn now to some more specific mechanisms 
by which the built environment and zoning may be linked.  
 B. Natural Surveillance 
Many have argued that design should “create opportunities for natural 
surveillance by residents, neighbors, and bystanders.”61 This concept is an 
extension of Jane Jacobs’s influential theory that “eyes on the street” and 
general street activity reduce criminal activity.62 Routine-activities theory, 
which is featured prominently in criminology literature, notes the importance 
 
59 See John H. Schweitzer et al., The Impact of the Built Environment on Crime and Fear of 
Crime in Urban Neighborhoods, J. URB. TECH., Dec. 1999, at 59, 66 (finding the presence of nearby 
stores associated with increased crime); Thomas D. Stucky & John R. Ottensmann, Land Use and 
Violent Crime, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1223, 1249 (2009) (finding that violent crime and the percentage 
of land use devoted to commercial activity were generally related, though this finding was 
conditioned on an area’s other socioeconomic characteristics); Ralph B. Taylor et al., Street Blocks 
with More Nonresidental Land Use Have More Physical Deterioration: Evidence from Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 120, 132 (1995) (“[R]esidential street blocks with more nonresi-
dential land uses have higher crime rates.” (citation omitted)). 
60 See, e.g., Stephanie W. Greenberg & William M. Rohe, Neighborhood Design and Crime: A 
Test of Two Perspectives, 50 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 48, 53 (1984); Greenberg et al., supra note 16, at 
151-54 (finding that low-crime neighborhoods contained fewer major streets and were more likely 
to have boundaries isolating them from other neighborhoods); Pamela Wilcox et al., Busy Places 
and Broken Windows? Toward Defining the Role of Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime 
Models, 45 SOC. Q. 185, 199-200 (2004) (finding that the existence of businesses and playgrounds 
in a neighborhood increases residential burglaries, but that the effect was mitigated by physical 
disorder and residential instability); Barbara Dietrick, The Environment and Burglary Victimization 
in a Metropolitan Suburb (finding residential burglary more frequent near commercial areas), 
reprinted in 2 AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH, THE LINK BETWEEN CRIME AND THE BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT: METHODOLOGICAL REVIEWS OF INDIVIDUAL CRIME-ENVIRONMENT 
STUDIES, at C-33, C-41 (Tetsuro Motoyama et al. eds., 1980); Xiaowen Yang, Exploring the 
Influence of Environmental Features on Residential Burglary Using Spatial-Temporal Pattern 
Analysis 99 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida), available at http:// 
gradworks.umi.com/32/24/3224656.html (finding at major street-block and census-block levels that 
burglaries were more common in mixed-use sites with heterogeneous zoning as compared to 
matched-control sites with homogeneous zoning). 
61 Katyal, supra note 3, at 1048; see also AL ZELINKA & DEAN BRENNAN, SAFESCAPE: 
CREATING SAFER, MORE LIVABLE COMMUNITIES THROUGH PLANNING AND DESIGN 8, 
10-11 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of natural surveillance and illustrating instances in which 
design can encourage or discourage natural surveillance). 
62 See Katyal, supra note 3, at 1050 (“Private individuals are responsible for the majority of 
crime prevention.”). 
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of capable guardianship in reducing the propensity of motivated offenders 
to commit crimes against suitable targets.63 Individuals who act as “eyes on 
the street” and are proactive in calling the police, or asking questions of 
potential criminals, may be more prevalent in areas where natural surveil-
lance makes the observation of strangers on the street easier. The process by 
which individuals living in neighborhoods actively intervene in ways that 
discourage problem behaviors has been termed “collective efficacy.”64  
Some empirical studies are consistent with the claim that natural  
surveillance is associated with lower crime. Studies of crime on or near mass 
transit confirm that visibility is important,65 and Thomas Molumby found that 
poor visibility helped predict the locations of crimes in a university housing 
project.66  Indeed, interviews with criminals suggest that they consider 
visibility when selecting targets.67 Convenience stores are often robbed in 
part because they are located far from the street to make room for parking. 
This distance hinders visibility and makes them an easy robbery target.68 
 
63 See Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine 
Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588, 590 (1979) (arguing that the presence of capable 
guardians alone is sufficient to prevent crime). 
64 See Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collec-
tive Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 922 (1997) (finding that “collective efficacy,” defined as the level of 
neighborhood social cohesion and willingness of residents to engage in informal social control 
activities, is linked to lower rates of crime and violence). 
65  See PATRICIA MAYHEW ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH UNIT, CRIME AS  
OPPORTUNITY 23-24 (1976) (finding that damage to bus seats in London is significantly more 
prevalent in areas with lower visibility); Richard Block & Carolyn Rebecca Block, The Bronx and 
Chicago: Street Robbery in the Environs of Rapid Transit Stations (finding low crime rates in areas 
immediately adjacent to mass transit in a study of the Bronx and Chicago), in ANALYZING 
CRIME PATTERNS: FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE 137, 147-48 (Victor Goldsmith et al. eds., 2000); 
R. Lance Shotland & Lynne Goodstein, The Role of Bystanders in Crime Control, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 
9, 18 (1984) (finding that increased ridership on New York subways reduced crime). 
66 Thomas Molumby, Patterns of Crime in a University Housing Project, 20 AM. BEHAV. SCI-
ENTIST 247, 256 (1976). 
67 See TREVOR BENNETT & RICHARD WRIGHT, BURGLARS ON BURGLARY: PREVENTION 
AND THE OFFENDER 58-62 (1984) (describing a study in which convicted burglars commented 
on the importance of cover in evaluating potential houses to burglarize); Sally E. Merry, Defensible 
Space Undefended: Social Factors in Crime Control Through Environmental Design, 16 URB. AFF. Q. 
397, 416 (1981) (indicating that robbers prefer locations with “narrow and enclosed pathways where 
visibility is poor and witnesses [are] non-existent”). 
68 See C. RAY JEFFERY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 
201, 205 (2d ed. 1977) (finding in a study of convenience store robberies that “lighting, . . . outdoor 
visibility, . . . and other opportunity structures were related to high robbery rates”); Carri Casteel 
& Corinne Peek-Asa, Effectiveness of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) in 
Reducing Robberies, 18 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 99, 100, 109 (2000) (summarizing twenty-six 
published studies generally finding that the adoption of CPTED principles, including increasing 
visibility into a store, can reduce robberies in convenience stores); see also Dennis C. Duffala, 
Convenience Stores, Armed Robbery, and Physical Environmental Features, 20 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST  
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Another study found that a housing project with an elevator lobby visible to 
the outside had a much lower crime rate than another project without a 
visible lobby.69 A much stronger experimental study randomly selected sixty 
convenience stores and increased the visibility of cashiers to passersby 
through measures like removing signs on windows and increasing lighting; 
the study found that these stores had significantly fewer robberies in an 
eight-month follow-up period compared to the sixty control stores with no 
additional visibility measures.70  
In theory, land use diversity could also increase natural surveillance by 
bringing more people to an area. Jacobs waxed rhapsodically about the 
benefits of mixed-use neighborhoods because varied uses attracted “eyes on 
the street” to deter crime.71 So, for example, she argued that bars should 
reduce residential crime because they bring people to the neighborhood.72 
Similarly, one study found that small businesses serve as both “watchers” of 
their surroundings and as central nodes of communication about crime.73  
Empirical research has suggested the importance of the watcher’s identity. 
Contrary to Jacobs’s hypothesis that bars would reduce crime by increasing 
street traffic, bars actually tend to increase assaultive behaviors and rob-
beries in neighborhoods.74 Moreover, a diversity of uses might make it 
harder to identify abnormal behaviors or the presence of potentially threat-
ening strangers. 
Lighting should also increase natural surveillance, both because it  
increases visibility and because it encourages more people to congregate in 
 
227, 244-45 (1976) (attributing a convenience store’s vulnerability to armed robbery to low 
vehicular traffic, more sparse commercial activity, and proximity to major transportation routes). 
69 See NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 87 (finding that a housing project with a visible lobby had 
a crime rate that was 33% below the New York City average while a building without a visible 
lobby had a crime rate that was 52% higher than the New York City average). One limitation of 
Newman’s study was its comparison of only two sites. Thus, it is entirely possible that these 
differences could have emerged by chance. 
70 See WAYMAN J. CROW & JAMES L. BULL, ROBBERY DETERRENCE: AN APPLIED  
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE DEMONSTRATION—FINAL REPORT (1975). 
71 See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 56 (“The trust of a city street is formed over time from 
many, many little public sidewalk contacts. It grows out of people stopping by at the bar for a 
beer, getting advice from the grocer and giving advice to the newsstand man . . . .”). 
72 See id. at 36-37 (stating that bars and restaurants “give people . . . concrete reasons for 
using sidewalks on which these enterprises face,” which in turn “draw[s] people along the 
sidewalks past places which have no attractions to public use in themselves”).  
73 See JOANNA SHAPLAND & JON VAGG, POLICING BY THE PUBLIC 23, 70-72 (1988) 
(describing the “almost unconscious” process of shopkeepers and employees to monitor what 
occurred outside their buildings). 
74 See Dennis W. Roncek & Ralph Bell, Bars, Blocks, and Crimes, 11 J. ENVTL. SYS. 35, 44 
(1981) (finding that “each additional bar on a residential block increases the incidence of index 
crimes by approximately four crimes”). 
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the lighted place.75 Many studies have documented the relationship between 
lighting and crime in different physical contexts.76 
Devices that attract people can also enhance natural surveillance. Some 
have suggested that neighborhood features like front porches or farmers’ 
markets decrease crime by bringing more people outdoors.77 However, 
despite the superficial plausibility of this hypothesis, the limited empirical 
evidence does not support it.78 
 C. Target-Hardening 
A related strand of research has focused on reducing burglary through 
target-hardening: making specific targets more difficult to burglarize through 
building codes mandating security measures like higher quality locks, im-
proved door frames, laminated glass, and motion-activated lighting.79 Research 
comparing changes in burglary rates after introducing new building codes 
suggests that such interventions can successfully reduce burglary without 
increasing other property crimes.80  
 
75 Katyal, supra note 3, at 1056-57. 
76 See CYRIL BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 160-63 (1925) (attributing increased prop-
erty offenses to longer periods of darkness in winter months); KATE PAINTER, INST. OF 
LIGHTING ENG’RS, A GUIDE FOR CRIME AND DISORDER REDUCTION THROUGH A 
PUBLIC LIGHTING STRATEGY (1999) (finding that lighting reduces crime); KEN PEASE, INST. 
OF LIGHTING ENG’RS, LIGHTING AND CRIME 7-8 (1999) (noting the high level of agreement 
in the research that “targeted increases in street lighting generally have crime reduction effects”); 
MARY S. SMITH, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRON-
MENTAL DESIGN IN PARKING FACILITIES 3 (1996) (stating that “[l]ighting is universally 
considered to be the most important security feature in a parking facility”); CRIME PREVENTION 
THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN 49 (Paul Stollard ed., 1991) (finding that “40% of night-time 
street crime occurs when lighting levels are at 5 lux or below . . . [and o]nly 3% of night-time 
street crime takes place when the lighting level is above 20 lux”); Sherry Plaster Carter et al., 
Zoning Out Crime and Improving Community Health in Sarasota, Florida: “Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design,” 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1442, 1444 tbl.1 (2003) (finding that application of 
CPTED principles, including improved lighting in conjunction with increased police presence, 
reduced crime in a high-crime neighborhood). 
77 Katyal, supra note 3, at 1057-58.  
78 See, e.g., Schweitzer et al., supra note 59, at 69 (finding that front porches are associated 
with greater crime in a study of Lansing, Michigan). 
79 See Katyal, supra note 3, at 1067-68 (noting instances in which British towns and housing 
projects reduced burgalries through target-hardening policies); John Hoffman, Building Codes Help 
Reduce Burglary, 46 LAW & ORD. 149 (1998) (discussing police officers’ efforts to change building 
codes to make housing more difficult to burglarize in Simi Valley, California; Overland Park, 
Kansas; and Toronto, Ontario). 
80 See Ben Vollaard & Jan C. van Ours, Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime?: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 121 ECON. J. 485, 503 (2011) (finding that a law requiring new 
homes in the Netherlands to have burglar-proof windows and doors was responsible for a 26% 
reduction in burglary). Similarly, empirical research shows that car thefts dropped sharply in  
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 D. Territoriality and Permeability 
Jacobs also argued that, to reduce crime, there should be clear differenti-
ation between public and private spaces.81 In his highly influential book 
Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, Oscar Newman 
argued that breaking housing up into less anonymous, more manageable 
units would improve public safety. He marshaled descriptive evidence to 
support his thesis, including a wealth of statistics on contexts ranging from 
student housing at St. Lawrence College82 to public housing projects in 
New York City.83  
Perhaps most dramatically, he compared two adjacent public housing 
projects in Brooklyn: Brownsville and Van Dyke. While both were similar 
in terms of density, size, and demographic characteristics, they had very 
different architectural forms. Brownsville had a more traditional mix of 
three- to six-story elevator and walk-up buildings.84 Van Dyke, in contrast, 
was comprised of fourteen-story towers with long hallways opening onto 
elevator banks and fire code–required stairwells.85 Between 112 and 136 
families shared each doorway leading into Van Dyke.86 In contrast, each 
entryway in Brownsville served only six to eighteen families.87 Van Dyke 
Homes had 66% more crime incidents than the Brownsville project and far 
more vandalism.88 While the research design was imperfect,89 the comparison 
illustrated the capacity of the built environment to reduce crime by altering 
territoriality. 
 
countries after auto manufacturers started installing ignition immobilizers and Lojack systems, 
making it more difficult to steal cars and avoid detection. Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, The 
Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 
331, 343-45 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2011).  
81 See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 35 (stating that, to improve safety, “[p]ublic and private 
spaces cannot ooze into each other as they do typically in suburban settings or in projects.”) 
82 See NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 75-77 (chronicling higher rates of problems with students 
living in newer dormitories with numerous individual rooms located along long hallways, as 
compared to those living in older dormitories divided into separate, smaller buildings with fewer 
rooms opening off more entryways). 
83 See id. at 69 (finding four-and-a-half crimes per thousand persons in hallways with two to 
five apartments as compared to more than eight crimes per thousand persons in hallways with six 
or more apartments). 
84 Id. at 40. 
85 Id. at 40-43. 
86 Id. at 41. 
87 Id. at 43. 
88 Id. at 47-48.  
89 Since the basis of comparison involved only two complexes, these differences could stem 
from simple chance or result from differences in the tenants chosen to live in each building type. 
One can imagine that the Brownsville design was a more desirable living environment and 
therefore attracted tenants who were less likely to be crime perpetrators and victims. 
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From his study, Newman concluded that the physical environment 
should “create perceived zones of territorial influence: mechanisms for the 
subdivision and articulation of areas of the residential environment intended 
to reinforce inhabitants in their ability to assume territorial attitudes and 
prerogatives.”90 
Katyal expounded on this argument: “Territoriality connotes ownership 
or stewardship of an area. It both provides an incentive for residents to take 
care of and to monitor an area and subtly deters offenders by warning them 
that they are about to enter a private space.”91 
Both Newman and Katyal note the relationship between territoriality 
and surveillance. Katyal explains: “Concern about territoriality should be 
balanced against the need for natural surveillance, so that spaces are neither 
too open nor too closed. If they are too closed, bystanders and residents 
cannot self-police; if they are too open, intrusion and crime could increase.”92 
Newman likewise comments that “improving visual surveillance opportuni-
ties may be a pointless task if the resident is viewing activity taking place in 
an area he does not identify with.”93 Similarly, another commentator has 
noted that communities that are too permeable can lead to a decrease in 
community social cohesion or “social cocooning.”94 
Some empirical support exists for Newman’s territoriality theory, as 
several studies have found that markers of territoriality are associated with 
lower crime.95 One study, however, noted that territorial displays are seen 
 
90 NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 50. 
91 Katyal supra note 3, at 1058-59; see also ALICE COLEMAN, UTOPIA ON TRIAL: VISION 
AND REALITY IN PLANNED HOUSING 138-39 (1985) (suggesting that crime could be reduced by 
physically limiting site accessibility and by demarcating private and public space). One earlier 
study also noted that territoriality provided a disincentive to burglars. After classifying territory as 
primary, secondary, or public territory, Barbara Brown and Irwin Altman suggested that burglars 
would reassess criminal prospects as they crossed territorial boundaries. See Barbara B. Brown & 
Irwin Altman, Territoriality and Residential Crime: A Conceptual Framework, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 64-67 (Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L. Brantingham eds., 1981). 
92 Katyal, supra note 3, at 1059. 
93 NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 50. 
94 RALPH B. TAYLOR & ADELE V. HARRELL, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PHYSICAL 
ENVIRONMENT AND CRIME 12-13 (1996) (noting that nonresidential land use and traffic can 
diminish residents’ sense of community); see also DONALD APPLEYARD, LIVABLE STREETS 9 
(1981) (claiming that increased traffic on city streets reduces social cohesion); Andrew Baum et al., 
Crowding and Neighborhood Mediation of Urban Density, 1 J. POPULATION 266, 276 (1978) (claiming 
that stores on a street reduce interaction among residents because more “unfamiliar” people use 
the street to visit stores). 
95 See, e.g., Ralph B. Taylor et al., User-Generated Visual Features as Signs in the Urban Residential 
Environment (finding that personalizations are perceived as signs that neighborhoods are safe), in 1 
THE BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF DESIGN 94, 94-100 (L.M. Ward et al. eds., 1976); Sidney Brower 
et al., Residents’ Perceptions of Territorial Features and Perceived Local Threat, 15 ENV’T & BEHAV.  
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as less effective deterrents when the perceived threat rises.96 Another study 
concluded that physical permeability matters more than markers of informal 
territorial control.97  
Considerable evidence links more neighborhood permeability with higher 
crime.98 Studies find that houses built on culs-de-sac have lower rates of 
burglary than houses on through-traffic streets, even after statistically 
controlling for the level of vacant housing, unemployment rate, age compo-
sition, and other factors in the surrounding census area.99 Similarly, houses 
farther from highway exits, on dead-end streets, and not on corners are less 
likely to be burglarized.100  
Moreover, a number of studies have found that street closures are effec-
tive in reducing some kinds of crime. 101  Interestingly, however, gated 
 
419, 434 (1983) (finding that gardens or other plants are “territorial sign[s]” that reduce trespassing 
and other crime); Barbara B. Brown, Residential Territories: Cues to Burglary Vulnerability, 2 J. 
ARCHITECTUAL & PLAN. RES. 231, 234-35 (1985) (finding that houses in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, with nameplates have lower rates of intrusion than those without nameplates); Ralph B. 
Taylor et al., Block Crime and Fear: Defensible Space, Local Social Ties, and Territorial Functioning, 21 
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 303, 306 fig.1 (1984) (proposing that defensible space features and 
local social ties reduced crime and fear both directly and indirectly through territorial functioning); 
see also Ralph B. Taylor & Stephen Gottfredson, Environmental Design, Crime, and Prevention: An 
Examination of Community Dynamics, 8 CRIME & JUST. 387, 411 (1986) (reviewing literature to 
conclude that “simple effects of physical environment on crime range from small to moderate”). 
96 Brower et al., supra note 95, at 430. 
97 See Greenberg et al., supra note 16, at 162-63 (basing its conclusion on a comparison of 
three pairs of matched neighborhoods in Atlanta, Georgia). 
98 See, e.g., CAROL BEVIS & JULIA BROWN NUTTER, MINN. CRIME PREVENTION CTR., 
CHANGING STREET LAYOUTS TO REDUCE RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY 22 (1977) (“Inaccessible 
street layouts are associated with low residential burglary rates.”); Garland F. White, Neighborhood 
Permeability and Burglary Rates, 7 JUST. Q. 57, 64 (1990) (finding that permeability is positively 
correlated with higher burglary); Yang, supra note 60, at 138-39 (noting that burglary in Gaines-
ville, Florida, was associated with every measure of permeability, including proximity to major 
roads, distance to public transportation, block length, gridiron street patterns, and location on 
through-traffic streets); see also Paul Cozens & Terence Love, Manipulating Permeability as a Process 
for Controlling Crime: Balancing Security and Sustainability in Local Contexts, 35 BUILT ENV’T 346, 
360 (2009) (recommending that street permeability be manipulated at the local level to reduce 
crime rates). 
99 See, e.g., Shane D. Johnson & Kate J. Bowers, Permeability and Burglary Risk: Are Cul-de-
Sacs Safer?, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 89, 109 tbl.5 (2010) (collecting studies that 
show that increased permeability is associated with increased risk of burglary). 
100 Simon Hakim et al., Target Search of Burglars: A Revised Economic Model, 80 PAPERS  
REGIONAL SCI. 121, 130-31 (2001); see also George Rengert & Simon Hakim, Burglary in Affluent 
Communities: A Planning Perspective (showing that the houses with the highest burglary rates are 
houses on busy residential streets or on back roads), in REDUCING CRIME THROUGH REAL 
ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 39, 46 figs.33-34 (Marcus Felson & Richard B. 
Peiser eds., 1998). 
101 See JAMES LASLEY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, “DESIGNING OUT” GANG HOMICIDES 
AND STREET ASSAULTS 1 (1998) (finding that creating culs-de-sac reduced serious homicides and  
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communities do not appear to exhibit lower crime rates than similar non-
gated communities.102 
Another important aspect of territoriality is to limit the number of people 
using particular common areas. Some scholars, for example, have suggested 
that entryways limited to six to twelve families create increased territoriali-
ty.103 Smaller groups are also more likely to “cognitively recognize” and 
informally influence their neighbors, which connects to the theoretical 
concept of “collective efficacy.”104 
The repeated finding that commercial land uses are associated with more 
crime may result because commercial land uses reduce territoriality and 
informal social control of residents.105 Residents in an area with nonresiden-
tial uses are less happy,106 less likely to have contact with their neighbors,107 
and less likely to be able to distinguish local residents and outsiders.108  
There is also a relationship between territoriality and natural surveil-
lance. Others have suggested that, without sufficient density, commercial 
strips (in contrast to higher-density commercial areas) might be associated 
with crime because the linearity of the commercial strip reduces activity and 
 
assaults in an experimental area of a Los Angeles neighborhood); Roger Matthews, Developing 
More Effective Strategies for Curbing Prostitution (finding a reduction in street prostitution following 
closures of streets), in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES, 74, 
78-79 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 2d ed., 1997).  
102 See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 128 (1997) (finding that, “although people may feel 
safer, they probably are not significantly safer” in gated communities). 
103 See, e.g., PAUL STOLLARD, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN 57 
(1991) (“The use of common entrances should be avoided wherever possible and invidual flat 
entrances should ideally be located at ground level.”). 
104  ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL  
ORGANIZATION OF GATHERING 112-113, 132-34 (1963); see also Sampson et al., supra note 64, at 
919 (“[S]ocially cohesive neighborhoods will prove the most fertile contexts for the realization of 
informal social control.”). 
105 See, e.g., Garnett, The People Paradox, supra note 3, at 46-47 (summarizing research finding 
that “suburban communities are more socially cohesive and their residents more socially involved 
than urban communities and urbanites”).  
106 See Baum, supra note 94, at 276 (attributing the difference in happiness between residents 
of areas with nonresidential land use and only residential land use to how often they must interact 
with “unfamiliar others”). 
107 See id. (“They seemed to withdraw, avoiding neighbors and outdoor areas interaction was 
likely.”); see also APPLEYARD, supra note 94, at 245 (noting that many people wish to escape from 
“crowded conditions”). 
108 See Brown & Altman, supra note 91, at 55 (claiming that nonresidential land use dimin-
ishes residents’ capability to survey spaces in their environment); Greenberg et al., supra note 16, 
at 61 (“Relative to high crime neighborhoods, the flow of outsiders into and out of lower crime 
neighborhoods appeared to have been limited by more homogeneous residential land use.”); 
Taylor et al., supra note 59, at 131 (finding that “resident-based informal control is weaker on 
blocks that are less homogeneously residential”). 
  
720 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 699 
 
eyes on the street.109 Similarly, some have argued that nonresidential uses 
may be associated with increased crime because those uses create holes in 
the fabric of the community, attract outsiders, and generally impair the 
facial recognition of those who belong in the neighborhood.110  
 Another study focused on land use in sixty street blocks in Philadelphia 
and compared stores with other nonresidential land use.111 The study found 
that nonresidential land use of all kinds decreased social ties and surveil-
lance. 112  Storefront land use was associated with more calls for police 
service, but most of the calls were not crime-related.113 The study also found 
more physical disorder in certain nonresidential areas.114 
 E. Physical Disorder 
Another aspect of the relationship between the built environment and 
crime is the relationship between physical disorder and crime. James Wilson 
and George Kelling’s famous “broken windows” hypothesis suggested that 
physical disorder could act as a signal to criminals about the lack of social 
investment in a community and could lead to increased crime.115 But the 
 
109 See Angel, supra note 14 (manuscript at 16) (describing how crime is reduced as the number 
of people on a street increases because “not enough potential victims are present and the likeliness 
of a rewarding opportunity is small”). 
110 See Ralph B. Taylor & Sidney Brower, Home and Near-Home Territories (noting that resi-
dents of a homogeneous block were more likely than residents of a mixed-use block to react to 
recent crime by creating informal patrol groups), in 8 HOME ENVTS. 183, 201-02 (Irwin Altman 
& Carol M. Werner eds., 1985); Taylor et al., supra note 95, at 317 (providing the results of a study 
that “confirms the notion that informal social control may directly reduce crime-related out-
comes”); Ralph B. Taylor et al., Territorial Cognitions and Social Climate in Urban Neighborhoods, 2 
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 289, 292 (1981) (hypothesizing that “as perceived homogeneity 
[in a neighborhood] increases, problems may decrease, insider/stranger distinctions may be easier, 
and responsibility may increase”);  
111 Ellen M. Kurtz et al., Land Use, Physical Deterioration, Resident-Based Control and Calls for 
Service on Urban Streetblocks, 15 JUST. Q. 121 (1998). 
112 Id. at 146. 
113 Id. at 146-47. 
114 Id. at 146 (finding that “blocks with more viable storefronts” are likely to lead to deterio-
ration, but that other nonresidential uses do not predict disorder). 
115 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1982, at 29, 31; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., MANHATTAN INST. 
CTR. FOR CIVIC INNOVATION, NO. 22, DO POLICE MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 18 (2001) (“One singularly important way [police can 
reduce crime] is by restoring and maintaining order, through ‘broken windows’ policing.”). But see 
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a 
Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 292-93 (2006) (re-analyzing Kelling and 
Sousa’s conclusion that order-maintenance policing led to a drop in crime and explaining that the 
study failed to consider that drug prevention may have affected these results). Dan Kahan argues 
that order-maintenance policing has a positive social impact and reduces crime by creating a social  
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precise relationship between physical disorder and crime (if any) remains 
unclear.116  
There have been several studies attempting to test this hypothesis. One 
empirical study suggested that a crime feedback loop exists in which weak 
neighborhood social cohesion leads to crime and disorder, which in turn 
leads to increased fear.117 This increased fear further weakens neighborhood 
cohesion.  
Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush conducted a careful cross-
sectional study that controlled for collective efficacy, land use, and some 
other measures. 118 They found no effect of observed physical disorder in 
neighborhoods on the probability that respondents living in these neighbor-
hoods reported a violent victimization, a household burglary, or theft in the 
past six months.119  
Others have looked at various forms of minor social disorder, which is 
often lumped with physical disorder in discussions of order-maintenance 
policing, and considered whether they have an effect on crime. For example, 
a study of data collected in New York City and a randomized five-city 
experiment of police foot patrol revealed that targeting minor crimes did 
not reduce more serious crime.120 
The role of land use in affecting disorder also remains unclear. One 
study of one hundred Seattle census blocks concluded that land use affected 
physical disorder, which in turn affected crime.121 However, the effect of 
land use on crime was complex. For example, while businesses seemed to 
increase physical disorder, they also seemed to decrease burglary. Businesses 
 
“perception of obedience to law.” Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 
VA. L. REV. 349, 367-73; see also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community 
Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1527-38 (2002) (“[T]he theory behind order-maintenance 
policing is that visible disorder undermines law-abiding norms.”). 
116 See Wilcox et al., supra note 60, at 185-90. 
117 Fred Markowitz et al., Extending Social Disorganization Theory: Modeling the Relationship 
between Cohesion, Disorder, and Fear, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 293, 314 (2001). 
118 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public 
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 603-609 (1999); see 
also id. at 637 (finding greater social and physical disorder with mixed land use and no relationship 
between public disorder and crime except for robbery). Sampson and Raudenbush also noted that 
past studies that found a relationship between physical disorder and crime had methodological 
problems, as those studies were based on neighborhood surveys that asked residents about both 
disorder and crime. Id. at 606.  
119 Id. 
120 Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 115, at 287-97; see also Jeffrey A. Fagan & Garth Davies, 
Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control in New York (finding no relation between stop-
and-frisk activity and crime, except among Hispanics), in GUNS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 191, 205 tbl.9.3 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003). 
121 Wilcox et al., supra note 60, at 201. 
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in unstable areas reduced burglary more than businesses in more stable 
neighborhoods.122 Another study found that street blocks with more nonres-
idential land uses had higher levels of physical deterioration: The authors 
hypothesized that “[r]esidential blocks with more nonresidential land uses may 
have more incivilities because the uses draw more people to the block and/or 
because the uses interfere with resident-based territorial functioning.”123 In 
other words, commercial uses create disorder by impeding territorial func-
tioning that would normally occur in residential areas. Nonetheless, these 
studies suffer from design limitations because the authors cannot isolate and 
measure the effects of land use from existing differences between areas. 
Another study, with a stronger design,124 was based on repeated observa-
tions of neighborhoods in Baltimore.125 It found that “crime causes later 
grime”—that there was an association between physical disorder and crime 
but that the causal arrow led from crime to physical disorder rather than the 
other way.126 
Finally, a team of Dutch researchers used a field experiment and found 
strong evidence that disorder tends to encourage other forms of disorder.127 
The researchers conducted six similar experiments and found that when the 
amount of graffiti increased, the level of littering and likelihood that people 
would steal a five-euro note also increased.128 Similarly, the presence of 
unreturned shopping carts increased littering.129 The study also discovered 
that having bicycles illegally locked to a fence increased the likelihood that 
people would trespass by taking a shortcut. 130 While these results are 
suggestive, it is unclear whether they also apply to serious crimes, especially 
those that involve direct personal victimization.  
 
122 Id. 
123 Taylor et al., supra note 59, at 120. Different nonresidential land uses, however, may have 
different effects. Id. at 130. For example, an industrial area, a school, a church, and a commercial 
area may each generate very different traffic patterns and cause different effects. 
124 We use the term “stronger” because the design of this study, by focusing on repeated 
observations, mitigates the problem of stable differences between areas skewing the results. 
125  RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND 
DECLINE (Hugh D. Barlow ed., 2000). 
126 Id. at 171-72. 
127 See Kees Keizer et al., The Spreading of Disorder, 322 SCIENCE 1681, 1684 (2008) (“[A]s 
certain norm-violating behavior becomes more common, it will negatively influence conformity to 
other norms and rules.”). 
128 Id. at 1683-84. 
129 Id. at 1684. 
130 Id. at 1683-84. 
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 F. Crime Attractors/Reducers 
Another strand of the literature focuses less on a global causal mecha-
nism and instead on specific land uses that are associated with increased or 
decreased crime. Jacobs, for example, hypothesized that parking lots, truck 
depots, and gas stations were harmful for city life131 but that bars and 
restaurants would reduce crime. 
Empirical research, however, has found that bars are, in fact, associated 
with increased crime.132 Other studies have found that particular kinds of 
crime are positively associated with institutional land ownership,133 public 
high schools,134 vacant lots,135 fast-food restaurants,136 and alcohol outlets.137  
Other research has charted the relationship between specific types of 
land use and particular kinds of crime. For example, one study found that 
 
131 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 234. 
132 See Dennis W. Roncek & Pamela A. Maier, Bars, Blocks, and Crimes Revisited: Linking the 
Theory of Routine Activities to the Empiricism of “Hot Spots,” 29 CRIMINOLOGY 725, 738 (1991); 
Dennis W. Roncek & Mitchell A. Pravatiner, Additional Evidence That Taverns Enhance Nearby 
Crime, 73 SOC. & SOC. RES. 185, 186 (1989). 
133 David Ley & Roman Cybriwsky, The Spatial Ecology of Stripped Cars, 6 ENV’T & BEHAV. 
53, 61 (1974). 
134 See Dennis W. Roncek & Donald Faggianni, High Schools and Crime: A Replication, 26 
SOC. Q. 491, 501-02 (1985); Dennis W. Roncek & Antoinette LoBosco, The Effect of High Schools 
on Crime in Their Neighborhoods, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 598, 606 tbl.3 (1983); Caterina Gouvis Roman, 
Schools as Generators of Crime: Routine Activities and the Sociology of Place 91-93 (Dec. 6, 
2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/201946.pdf. But see Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic 
Schools and Broken Windows, 9 J. EMP. L. STUD. 347, 365-66 (2012) (finding that neighborhoods 
that experienced closures of local Catholic schools experienced less decrease in crime than other 
neighborhoods and suggesting social capital as the most plausible explanation). 
135 See Dennis C. Duffala, Convenience Stores, Armed Robbery, and Physical Environment Features, 
20 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 227, 239 (1976) (suggesting that stores near vacant lots are more 
vulnerable to armed robbery than are stores near commercial lots). 
136 Patricia L. Brantingham & Paul J. Brantingham, Mobility, Notoriety, and Crime: A Study of 
Crime Patterns in Urban Nodal Points, 11 J. ENVTL. SYS. 89 (1982). 
137 See, e.g., Dennis M. Gorman et al., Spatial Dynamics of Alcohol Availability, Neighborhood 
Structure and Violent Crime, 62 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 628, 634 (2001); Richard A. Scribner, et al., 
The Risk of Assaultive Violence and Alcohol Availability in Los Angeles County, 85 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 335, 338 (1995); Paul W. Speer et al., Violent Crime and Alcohol Availability: Relationships 
in an Urban Community, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 303, 311 (1998); Richard J. Stevenson et al., 
The Relationship Between Alcohol Sales and Assault in New South Wales, Australia, 94 ADDICTION 
397, 407 (1999); L. Zhu et al., Alcohol Outlet Density and Violence: A Geospatial Analysis, 39 
ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 369, 372 (2004); Richard Scribner et al., Alcohol Availability and 
Homicide in New Orleans: Conceptual Considerations for Small Area Analysis of the Effect of Alcohol 
Outlet Density, 60 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 310, 314-15 (1999); William Alex Pridemore & Tony H. 
Grubesic, Alcohol Outlets and Community Levels of Interpersonal Violence: Spatial Density, Outlet Type, 
and Seriousness of Assault, J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. (May 17, 2011), http://jrc.sagepub.com/ 
content/early/2011/04/15/0022427810397952. 
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street robberies were most strongly associated with the number of nearby 
hotels and motels.138 The same study found that other land uses—including 
bars, restaurants, gas stations, and parking lots—were more weakly associated 
with street robberies.139 In one study of Seattle, the presence of playgrounds 
decreased violent crime in highly unstable neighborhoods, contrary to the 
authors’ expectations.140 However, playgrounds were also correlated with 
increased burglaries.141 William McCarty found that mobile-home commu-
nities in Omaha, Nebraska, were not associated with increased crime 
compared to other kinds of residential communities.142 Another line of 
studies discovered higher crime rates in blocks with public housing projects.143 
In addition, one study found that higher rates of home foreclosure contrib-
uted to higher crime rates.144  
One particularly strong empirical study of the association between the 
presence of alcohol outlets and crime rates avoided many of the selection-
bias problems previously noted. The study compared the crime rates in 
places before alcohol outlets opened or closed to the rates in places where 
alcohol outlets stayed open. Because alcohol outlets operated in both locations 
(where outlets opened or closed and where outlets stayed open), this method 
reduces an important source of selection bias. The study found that the 
opening of alcohol outlets in low socioeconomic neighborhoods affected 
crime rates.145  
 
138 William R. Smith et al., Furthering the Integration of Routine Activity and Social Disorganization 
Theories: Small Units of Analysis and the Study of Street Robbery as a Diffusion Process, 38 CRIMINOL-
OGY 489, 507 (2000). 
139 See id.  
140 Wilcox et al., supra note 60, at 199. 
141 See id. (“In contrast to violent crime findings, presence of playgrounds was positively 
associated to burglary.”). 
142 See William P. McCarty, Trailers and Trouble? An Examination of Crime in Mobile Home 
Communities, 12 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 127, 136-37 (2010). 
143 See TERENCE DUNWORTH & AARON SAIGER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DRUGS 
AND CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A THREE-CITY ANALYSIS 36-37 (1994) (finding higher 
rates of reported violent crime in areas with housing projects than rates in nearby neighboorhoods 
in Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles, California; and Phoenix, Arizona); Thomas L. McNulty & 
Steven R. Holloway, Race, Crime, and Public Housing in Atlanta: Testing a Conditional Effect 
Hypothesis, 79 SOC. FORCES 707, 722 (2000) (finding an association between higher crime rates 
and predominantly Black neighborhoods when the neighborhoods are in close proximity to public 
housing); Dennis W. Roncek et al., Housing Projects and Crime: Testing a Proximity Hypothesis, 29 
SOC. PROBS. 151, 157 (1981) (finding crime rates higher on blocks with housing projects). 
144 See Michael Bess, Assessing the Impact of Home Foreclosures in Charlotte Neighborhoods,  
GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY, Oct. 2008, at 2, 3 (2008). 
145 See Bing-ru Teh, Essays on Crime and Urban Economics 22 (Spring 2008) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). 
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Research has also noted that crime is not evenly distributed and instead 
clusters in crime “hot spots.” While not specifically focused on land use, a 
seminal paper analyzed police-call data in Minneapolis and found hot spots 
in commercial establishments—namely, a department store, a discount store, 
a convenience store, and a bar.146  
Finally, there has been some research on crime reducers—institutions 
that may be effective at reducing neighborhood crime. One study concluded 
that Catholic schools appeared to reduce crime and found that Catholic-
school closures are associated with a relative increase in crime.147 MacDonald 
et al. found that business improvement districts (BIDs)—organizations created 
by property owners to provide public goods—reduced robberies and other 
violent crimes in Los Angeles.148 Finally, some research suggests that more 
vegetation is associated with less crime149 and fear of crime.150 
G. Density 
Land use law can also affect commercial and residential density, but 
density’s effect on crime has not been thoroughly researched. A recent study 
of Columbus, Ohio, found interesting curvilinear relationships between 
density and rates of aggravated assault and homicide.151 At low levels of 
aggregation (blocks), increases in density were associated with increases in 
these crimes.152 At larger geographic levels of analysis, however, increases in 
commercial and residential densities were associated with reductions in 
these crimes.153 Other studies have found that density was not associated 
with higher crime when the socioeconomic status of the residents was added 
 
146 See Lawrence Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Crimi-
nology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 45 tbl.5 (1989). 
147 Brinig & Garnett, supra note 134, at 366.  
148 John MacDonald et al., The Effect of Business Improvement Districts on the Incidence of Violent 
Crimes, 16 INJ. PREVENTION 327, 331 (2010); see also Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, Public 
Safety through Private Action: An Economic Assessment of BIDs, 121 ECON. J. 445, 453 (2011) (“The 
introduction of BIDs is associated with roughly 28 fewer total serious crimes per neighborhood.”). 
149 Frances E. Kuo & William C. Sullivan, Environment and Crime in the Inner City: Does 
Vegetation Reduce Crime?, 33 ENV’T & BEHAV. 343, 346 (2001). 
150 See Irus Braverman, Governing Certain Things: The Regulation of Street Trees in Four North 
American Cities, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 47 (2008) (suggesting a negative correlation between the 
amount of trees and vegetation and the level of fear of crime). 
151 Christopher R. Browning et al., Commercial Density, Residential Concentration, and Crime: 
Land Use Patterns and Violence in Neighborhood Context, 47 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 329, 343-50 
(2010). 
152 Id. at 343. 
153 Id. The authors also found that, unlike homicide and aggravated assault, robbery was 
consistently positively associated with density at all levels. Id. at 344. 
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as a controlling variable.154 While the empirical literature points to potential 
relationships between zoning density and crime, the mechanisms for 
explaining the association have not been rigorously assessed. 
 H. Limits to Existing Research 
As described above, considerable literature analyzes the relationships 
between land use, the built environment, and crime—both theoretically and 
empirically. However, a key problem with existing research is that it has 
been, with a few notable exceptions,155 nonexperimental and based simply 
on examining cross-sectional correlations. While these studies are useful, 
they do not support strong conclusions about the causes of crime, because 
they have not shown whether the particular land use is causing crime or 
whether there is another factor that may be causing both the observed land 
use and the crime. 
There are a number of high-quality quasi-experimental studies that  
examine changes in crime levels subsequent to alterations in the physical 
environment resulting from the establishment of business improvement 
districts, modifications to building codes, and the closing of schools, road-
ways, and liquor stores.156 But these studies do not specifically examine 
alterations in the built environment caused by land use zoning. The dearth 
of rigorous empirical studies on land use zoning types raises the concern 
that some of the findings reported in the literature are artifacts of selection 
bias. For example, we may need to reconsider the simultaneous relation-
ships between different land use types and crime as a result of a similar 
underlying condition, such as poverty concentration. Individuals living below 
 
154 See Yang, supra note 60, at 102 (finding a correlation between low density and burglary 
cases); Jianling Li & Jack Rainwater, The Real Picture of Land Use Density and Crime: A GIS 
Application, ESRI, http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc00/professional/papers/PAP508/ 
p508.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (presenting the results of an Irving, Texas, study finding that 
high density and multi-family development were not necessarily associated with higher crime, 
although low socioeconomic status was so associated). While not specifically analyzing crime, Ronald 
Lafferty and H.E. Frech found that increases in non–single family land uses raised property 
values when sufficiently concentrated. When dispersed, however, the non–single family land uses 
reduced property values. Ronald N. Lafferty & H.E. Frech III, Community Environment and the 
Market Value of Single-Family Homes: The Effect of the Dispersion of Land Uses, 21 J.L. & ECON. 381, 
382, 387-88 (1978). 
155 See, e.g., CROW & BULL, supra note 70, at 74-92 (using an experimental design to show 
that modifications in the physical environments of convenience stores reduce robberies); Keizer et 
al., supra note 127 (using an empirical design to show that physical disorder appears to lead to 
additional physical disorder and minor law-breaking, such as littering and trespassing, but leaving 
open whether physical disorder leads to more serious forms of crime). 
156 See Vollaard & van Ours, supra note 80, at 16 (building codes); Cook & MacDonald, supra 
note 148, at 453-54 (BIDs).  
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the poverty line have fewer choices about the neighborhoods in which they 
can live and, as a result, they select into different land use mixes than more 
affluent households.  
Determining the direction of causality may also be difficult. For example, 
a change in the crime rate can lead to changes in land use if policymakers or 
landowners perceive that areas should undergo redevelopment. In this case, 
it may be that the change in crime rate causes the change in land use rather 
than the reverse.  
Similarly, policymakers may simultaneously change multiple factors that 
may, in turn, affect crime. Suppose, for example, that policing increases at 
the same time that land use changes. If there is a subsequent change in 
crime, it is difficult to determine whether the change in policing or land use 
is responsible. The lack of rigorous research designs limits the extent to 
which we understand how, if at all, land use affects crime.  
In short, land use regulations likely affect crime via the built environ-
ment through a number of plausible mechanisms, but there is a limited 
understanding of the specific micro-level details of these relationships and 
how public-health law could improve land use policies in communities most 
affected by crime. Moreover, while we have several quasi-experimental 
examinations of how alterations of land use can affect crime, most of these 
alterations are not directly tied to zoning law itself.157 As a result, we have 
plenty of clues but we lack rigorous empirical research identifying how 
modifying land use through zoning laws can influence crime. As we explain 
in the next Part, by focusing on zoning—which changes infrequently—
rather than on actual land use, we are able to overcome some of these 
methodological obstacles. 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF LAND USE LAW ON 
THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND CRIME 
The core research question in this Article is whether there exists a rela-
tionship between land use zoning and crime, and if so, whether it is  
observed through visible differences in the built environment. In this Part, 
we attempt to answer this question in three steps. First, we examine the 
association between crime and the primary zoning of parcels of land on 
street blocks within the same geographic areas of the city. Second, we 
examine the associations between the primary zoning of parcels of land on 
 
157 These studies do not assess the overall relationship between land use zoning and crime 
because they are specific to special building provisions or BIDs. See Vollaard & van Ours, supra 
note 80, at 485-87 (modifications of building provisions); see also MacDonald et al., supra note 148, 
at 329-31 (establishment of BIDs).  
  
728 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 699 
 
street blocks and physical order maintenance, territoriality, natural surveil-
lance, and “walkability.” Finally, we examine whether the observed associa-
tion between land use zoning of parcels and crime is mediated by differences 
in the built environment. This will help ascertain whether land use law affects 
crime through the built environment or whether some other causal mecha-
nism is at work. 
Our general strategy in this study is to compare the crime rates on and 
around street blocks with different types of parcel zoning but within the 
same geographic areas in Los Angeles. Block-to-block comparisons in the 
same sections of the city reduce the risk that unobserved confounding 
variables (e.g., demographic differences) will bias the results.158 While this 
method helps control for many potential confounding variables, it is 
possible that some unobserved variables remain that are correlated with 
both zoning and crime. We are, however, unable to identify any particularly 
plausible candidates that would affect both crime and zoning at a block-by-
block level of analysis within the same sections of a city having a comparable 
demographic makeup. Zoning changes may be requested by property 
owners, or as part of a comprehensive redevelopment project, but they 
require considerable effort and are relatively uncommon.159 Because of the 
relative infrequency of zoning changes, the likelihood of reverse causation is 
low (i.e., crime causing zoning changes). 
One alternative avenue of research, which we did not pursue, involves 
examining the actual land use rather than the zoning classification of 
parcels. We decided to use zoning classifications for several reasons. First, 
changing the zoning of a parcel is easier than changing its actual use. 
Policymakers can, for example, change zoning by passing a new ordinance. 
Our focus on zoning thus acknowledges it as a tool within the reach of 
policymakers. Second, zoning evolves more slowly over time than does land 
use. Zoning is, therefore, less likely to be affected by crime than actual land 
use, making our inference stronger. If we examined the effect of actual land 
use on crime, it would be more difficult to determine whether land use 
affects crime, or whether crime affects changes in land use. 
 
158 We use zoning variations among street blocks as our primary identification strategy. See 
JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 7-
8 (2009) (describing an identification strategy as an analytic method which permits the researcher 
to use observational data in a way that approximates a randomized experiment). 
159 The city of Los Angeles changed zoning designations for only 361 parcels from 2006 to 
2010. See infra text accompanying notes 216-22. 
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 A. Sample Construction 
For our study, we selected 205 face blocks160 in eight Community Plan 
Areas in Los Angeles.161 Table 1 below displays the number of blocks in each 
area. We chose these areas because they have medium or high levels of 
crime relative to other sections of the city.162 The 205 blocks were selected 
based on the following criteria: (1) primary and mix of parcel zoning on 
observed block; (2) primary and mix of parcel zoning on nearby blocks; (3) 
proximity to parks, schools, Metro (rail) stations, and freeway on-ramps; 
and (4) geographical severance of block face by roadway (freeway).163  
 
 
Table 1: Number of Street Blocks in Community Planning Areas 
 
Area Name Number of blocks Percentage of total 
Boyle Heights  25 12.2% 
Highland Park  30 14.6% 
Hollywood  16 7.8% 
San Pedro  22 10.7% 
South Los Angeles 38 18.5% 
Southeast Los Angeles 33 16.1% 
West Adams  20 9.8% 
Westlake  21 10.2% 
 
 
Our empirical strategy measures the association between zoning and 
reported crime by comparing the crime rates among blocks within the same 
areas having different primary forms of parcel zoning. To confirm that 
differently zoned blocks within the same area did not differ systematically on 
key variables, we compared data from the 2000 Census164 for mixed- and 
single-zoned blocks. Specifically, we compared these blocks using the follow-
ing variables: (1) percentage of African American residents, (2) percentage 
 
160 A face block refers to the properties on opposite sides of a common street. 
161 See Community Plan Area, CITY OF L.A.: DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., http://cityplanning. 
lacity.org (select “General Plan”; then “Community Plans”; then “35 Community Plans”) (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
162 Higher levels of crime increase our ability to detect an effect of land use zoning on 
crime—assuming one exists. 
163 We were, of course, unable to randomize the zoning of blocks selected in the sample. To 
avoid biasing the results of the analysis through block selection, we selected blocks without any 
knowledge of their crime rates. 
164 See American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/ (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2012) (providing public access to data from the 2000 United States census). 
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of Hispanic residents, (3) percentage of male residents under the age of 
twenty-five, (4) percentage of employed residents, (5) average housing 
tenure,165 and (6) percentage of families receiving welfare. These variables 
are widely used measures of social disadvantage that are correlated with 
neighborhood crime rates.166  
Table 2 below reveals substantial variability across the eight areas of Los 
Angeles on the census measures. More importantly, however, Table 2 shows 
considerable similarity across blocks within each area—regardless of zoning 
classification.167 Within areas, there are no meaningful differences between 
mixed zoning, on the one hand, and commercial and residential zoning, on 
the other, relative to the percentage of African American residents, the 
percentage of Hispanic residents, the percentage of males under twenty-
five, the percentage of employed residents, and average housing tenure.168 
For the percentage of families receiving welfare, only one area showed any 
difference across zoning classifications: in Southeast Los Angeles, the 
percentage of families receiving welfare is lower in mixed-zoned blocks 
(17.7%) than in other zoned blocks (24%). Even this difference, however, is 
not particularly large. These findings provide some assurance that differently 
zoned blocks within each area have similar population attributes. 
 
 
165 Average housing tenure is measured as the percentage of occupants that have resided in 
their current homes for five years or more. 
166 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood and Crime: The Structural Determinants of Personal 
Victimization, 22 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 13-16 (1985) (controlling for unemployment, racial 
composition, and residential mobility in a study of the causes of personal victimization). 
167 There are only 109 unique census tracts across the 205 blocks, meaning that a number of 
blocks share the same census tract and, therefore, share the same census data. We do not display 
census data at a lower level of aggregation, such as census blocks, because the number of observa-
tions is too low to obtain reliable demographic estimates. However, when we examine census 
block data for the 191 unique census blocks associated with the 205 face blocks on basic racial and 
ethnic demographics, we see no difference across zoning classifications. 
168 We do not present the statistics for percentage of Hispanics, percentage of males under 
twenty-five, and average housing tenure, as they were not different within any area by zone 
classification. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Demographic Features Across  
Multiple versus Single Use Block Zones169 
 
 Employed (%) African American (%) Sample Size (n =) 
  Area Name Mixed C|R Mixed C|R Mixed C|R 
Boyle Heights 90.1 87.7 .05 .09 6 19 
Highland Park 91.5 91.5 .07 2.3 6 24 
Hollywood 88.6 88.8 3.9 3.1 6 10 
San Pedro — 91.2 — 7.5 0 17 
South L.A. 85.7 86.0 48.4 58.4 9 29 
Southeast L.A. 82.9 82.8 22.3 29.3 10 23 
West Adams 89.8 91.7 32.8 33.4 10 10 
Westlake 86.9 86.4 3.5 3.1 7 14 
Overall Sample 87.5 87.9 19.3 20.4 54 146 
        
B. Data 
We constructed a data set containing data of three types: land use data on 
zoning, crime data at the street block–level, and observed built-environment 
data collected by field researchers.  
1. Land Use Data 
The land use zoning classifications for all parcels included in the study’s 
205 blocks were collected from publicly accessible data from the City of Los 
Angeles.170 We employ two different classification schemes for land use.  
First, we classify blocks into four broad categories: residential (n = 122 
blocks), commercial (n = 22), mixed-use (residential and commercial parcel 
zoning) (n = 57), and manufacturing (n = 4). Each block was classified based 
on the two most common parcel classifications on the block. 
Second, we use an alternative set of categories that is more sensitive to 
different kinds of residential and commercial usage. This second formula-
tion uses the following categories: multipurpose commercial zoning (con-
taining more than a single kind of commercial zone) (n = 21), single-purpose 
commercial/industrial zoning (n = 19), single purpose residential zoning (n = 
 
169 “Mixed” represents mixed zoning and “C|R” represents commercial or residential zoning. 
The three mixed zoning blocks in San Pedro had no census tract data available.  
170 See ZIMAS, http://zimas.lacity.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (providing public zoning 
data for the City of Los Angeles in the Zone Information and Map Access System). 
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99), and mixed-purpose zoning (containing both residential and commercial 
zones) (n = 66). A simple way to conceptualize the distinction between multi-
purpose commercial and mixed-purpose blocks is that multipurpose com-
mercial blocks have only commercial zoning, whereas mixed-purpose blocks 
have either residential zoning mixed in with commercial zoning or multiple 
forms of residential zoning. Given that many cities encourage mixed-
purpose zoning plans, it is useful to compare multiple forms of residential 
zoning. One can easily imagine, for example, a zoning plan that allows 
mixed-purpose uses for residential and commercial zoning, but does not 
allow exclusionary zoning for a single residential or commercial purpose.  
2. Crime Data 
Crime data were extracted from the Los Angeles Times’s open-source data 
on crime as reported by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and 
the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD).171 The number and types of 
reported crimes within 100 and 250 meters of each of the 205 blocks in the 
study were collected for a six-month interval.172 Our analyses examine total 
crime,173 as well as assaults, burglaries, robberies, and automobile break-ins, 
because these offenses are most likely to occur in public view and to be 
influenced by characteristics of the built environment.174 
 
171 We compared data that we obtained directly from the LAPD with the crime data posted 
publicly by the Los Angeles Times. We mapped the Los Angeles Times’s data using ArcGIS onto 
police reporting districts—the smallest aggregate level of geography available for analysis captured 
in the LAPD database—and found 86–90% agreement on the number and types of crimes in each 
district between 2009 and 2010. On average, the numbers were slightly larger in the Los Angeles 
Times’s data because they include both LAPD and LASD crime data. The Los Angeles Times’s data 
is geo-coded and cleaned, and includes crimes reported to the LASD, thereby making it preferable 
for our block-level analysis. In the subsequent empirical analysis of police reporting districts, we 
use only the LAPD data for the years 1994 to 2010, because the Los Angeles Times data are not 
available prior to 2009. About Mapping L.A., L.A. TIMES, http://projects.latimes.com/mapping-
la/about/#crime-data-sources (last visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
172 Specifically, we use crime data from July 1, 2010, to January 6, 2011. This time range was 
chosen for two reasons. First, it encompassed the period in which our field researchers conducted 
the systematic field observations discussed infra in subsection III.C.3. Second, it is long enough to 
guard against drawing conclusions from random week-by-week fluctuations. 
173 We use Part 1 index felony offenses reported by the LAPD and LASD, which include 
assault, burglary, homicide, theft, theft from vehicle, grand-theft automobile, rape, and robbery. 
174 It is worth noting that we only observe reported crime. Ideally we would want information 
about unreported crime as well. It is theoretically possible that zoning or land use might affect the 
likelihood that a crime is reported, but we are not aware of any research suggesting that these 
offenses are underreported by land use.  
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3. Built Environment Data 
Data on the built environment of blocks in the study were collected using 
systematic social observation. We modified and applied data collection 
instruments that were developed in a previous study of Los Angeles 
neighborhoods.175 Field observers examined blocks in the study over a 
twelve-week period, from August 19, 2010, to November 13, 2010.176 
Following the prior scholarly work on the relationship between the built 
environment and crime, 177  our systematic observation collected data to 
construct six measures of the built environment. First, we measured the 
general condition of a block, which included observers’ overall assessment of 
the condition of street surfaces for driving, the condition of the sidewalks 
for walking, and the condition of residential, commercial, and industrial 
buildings. Second, we measured physical disorder through the presence of 
garbage, litter, and broken glass; signs of illegal drug activity; cigarette 
butts; feces or urine; and graffiti. Third, we measured territoriality by 
recording the presence of well-tended yards, flowerboxes or planters, and 
flags on properties. Fourth, following Jacobs’s work on the potential for 
“eyes on the street”178 to reduce crime, we measured natural surveillance: 
observers estimated the number of buildings standing more than fifteen feet 
from the street and recorded the presence of front porches, driveways, and 
buildings without windows.179 Fifth, we captured data on the presence of 
establishments that attract crime. We included a sum of binary variables 
measuring the presence of bars, pawnshops, check cashing businesses, liquor 
 
175  See JOHN MACDONALD ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS ON CRIME AND 
YOUTH VIOLENCE: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS IN LOS ANGELES 
35-37 (2009) (describing the study’s data collection protocol). 
176 Observational data on the built environment were collected by field observers after they 
completed a three-step training course. In the first step, observers reviewed the coding items with 
one of the investigators (Dr. Ricky Bluthenthal) and an experienced coding staff member 
(Heather Guenzel). Observers were provided a description and rationale for each item, along with 
examples of each response category. In the second step, experienced staff held practice sessions 
with the trainees. In the field, staff addressed incongruent responses and discussed interpretations 
of ambiguous features of the physical and social environment. In the third step, observers 
independently coded the same face blocks. Initial congruence on responses was very high for most 
items. There was 95% agreement within one interval on most items (i.e., responses that were 
“good” or “very good” were considered concurrent). On items of disagreement, retraining was 
conducted, and in some cases, response categories were clarified or amended in consultation with 
the principal investigators to improve consistency in data collection.  
177 See supra Section II.A. 
178 See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 35. 
179 We include this measure because some theorists have suggested that natural surveillance 
reduces crime. See, e.g., id.  
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stores, and convenience stores on each block.180 Sixth, we measured the 
walkability of each block. Walkability may affect crime, either by increasing 
street traffic and “eyes on the street” or by increasing the number of poten-
tial victims of crime. We therefore obtained “Walk Score” data, based on 
the proximity of nearby amenities that decrease the need for personal 
automobiles, such as grocery stores, coffee shops, and public transit.181  
We computed each measure of the built environment by summing its 
individual items. Higher scores indicate greater levels of an attribute. 
Correlations among our different measures of the built environment were 
small,182 suggesting that they are, in fact, independent dimensions of the 
built environment. 
C. Results 
1. The Association Between Zoning Classifications and Crime 
We present a series of regressions to estimate the effect of a block’s land 
use classification on crime within 100 and 250 meters.183 Table 3 below 
presents the results of a model based upon the first classification of zoning 
described above, namely, one that divides blocks into residential, commercial, 
and mixed-use categories.184 The entries in the table represent incidence-
 
180 See Casteel & Peek-Asa, supra note 68; Scribner et al., supra note 137; Sherman et al., 
supra note 146 at 45 tbl.5; Thomas J. Miles, Markets for Stolen Property: Pawnshops and Crime 
25 (Jan. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersand 
programs/lawandeconomics/workshops/Documents/Winter2008/miles.pdf (finding that “pawn-
shops increase crimes in which pawnable goods are taken and that they have minimal effect on 
other types of criminal activity”). 
181 We obtained this data through WalkScore.com. Its index of walkability has been used in a 
wide variety of research. See Walkability Research, WALK SCORE PROF., http://www.walkscore.com/ 
professional/walkability-research.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (listing studies that have used Walk 
Score data). 
182 The largest bivariate correlation was between surveillance and crime attractors (r = -0.36). 
183 We use these limited distances because larger distances lead to overlapping blocks. We 
also estimated regression models at 500 meters as a falsification test because we would not expect 
land use on a specific block to influence crime 500 meters away. The results from these models 
show no relationship between crime and zoning variation. 
184 Model 1 is defined as: Crimeia = μ + βResidentiali + ΨCommerciali + δAreaa + sia. In this 
model, Residential is a dummy variable indicating whether observed block i has residential zoning, 
and Commercial is a dummy variable indicating whether observed block i has commercial zoning. 
Mixed-use is the reference category and is not included in the regression equation. Area is a 
categorical variable indicating the Community Plan Area in which the observed block is located.  
δ represents a fixed-effect parameter for each Community Plan Area to control for overall differences 
in crime in these areas. Crimes are recorded as counts for each block, and we use Poisson 
regression models (Yia ~ Poisson(λia)) to estimate the logarithm of the count. See A. COLIN 
CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 1, 8-10 (1998) 
(describing the mathematical theory underlying Poisson regression and its application to count data).  
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rate ratios. An incidence-rate ratio of 2.0, for example, means that twice the 
expected number of crimes occurred on the block. Mixed-use blocks serve as 
the reference category. In other words, the incidence-rate ratios for residen-
tial and commercial blocks are measured relative to the average crime rate 
on mixed-use blocks. Table 3 below reveals that residential blocks have 
significantly less crime in nearly all categories than mixed-use blocks, in both 
the 100- and 250-meter models. The sole exception to this general pattern is 
burglary, which is lower in mixed-use areas than in strictly commercial or 
strictly residential areas.185 We also observe smaller coefficients at the 250-
meter metric, which is expected as crimes from blocks that are further away 
are included in the count. Interestingly, these results provide empirical 
support for the early defenders of zoning who argued in favor of residential-
only zoning on the grounds that commercial establishments tend to increase 
crime.186 Apparently, their intuition was correct. 
 
 
 
185 We estimate these models using robust standard errors to adjust for overdispersion 
around the expected average count of crimes on blocks. Though robust standard errors do not 
influence the size of our estimates, the p-values in some of the models in Table 3 (including auto 
theft at 100 meters, total crime at 250 meters, and theft at 250 meters) exceed 0.05 (two-tailed test) 
for commercial zoning, meaning those findings are not statistically significant. The relatively small 
sample size for commercially zoned blocks leads to more variability around the average, which is 
adjusted by using a wider standard error according to the robust standard errors specifications.  
186 See, e.g., Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 386-87 (Cal. 1925) (discussing residential 
zoning as a means of promoting public health and morals); State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 97 
So. 440, 443-44 (La. 1923) (finding city zoning ordinances justified by concerns over public safety 
and general welfare); State ex rel. Morris v. City of E. Cleveland, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 549, 556 
(C.P. Cuyahoga County 1920) (finding a zoning ordinance limiting the construction of apartment 
buildings to be within the city’s police power because it safeguards public health and morals). 
From a policy perspective, however, this finding is of limited utility because it is difficult to 
conceive of constructing a large city with only residential zoning. 
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Table 3: Estimated Effect of Zoning Classifications on Crime187 
100 meters Total Assault Robbery Theft Burglary 
Auto 
Theft 
Residential 0.58* 
(.50-.68) 
0.78 
(.53-1.13) 
0.41* 
(.29-.59) 
0.34* 
(.23-.50) 
1.81* 
(1.09-3.00) 
0.84 
(.58-1.22) 
Commercial188 2.43* 
(2.09-2.83) 
1.93* 
(1.26-2.94) 
2.13* 
(1.52-2.96) 
4.86* 
(3.55-6.64) 
3.33* 
(1.90-5.82) 
1.71* 
(1.12-2.63) 
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.26 0.35 0.39 0.26 0.28 
 
250 meters 
 
Total 
 
Assault 
 
Robbery 
 
Theft 
 
Burglary 
 
Auto 
Theft 
Residential 0.67* 
(.63-.71) 
0.94 
(.78-1.14) 
0.65* 
(.55-.77) 
0.42* 
(.36-.49) 
1.07 
(.90-1.28) 
0.68* 
(.58-.79) 
Commercial 1.36* 
(1.26-1.47) 
1.68* 
(1.35-2.10) 
1.66*  
(1.38-1.99) 
1.54*  
(1.32-1.79) 
1.20 
(.95-1.51) 
0.95 
(.77-1.17) 
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.30 0.37 0.30 0.41 0.39 
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed); n = 205 blocks. All models include area-level fixed effects. 
 
In our next model, we use the second categorization of blocks described 
above. We divide blocks into residential, multiple-use commercial, single-
use commercial, and mixed use (which includes residential-use, commercial-
use and residential-use mixed together). Mixed-use serves as the reference 
group. Table 4 below presents results from the model using this alternative 
categorization of the blocks.189 Zoning classification predicts considerable 
variation in crime across blocks. For example, multiple-use commercial 
blocks have an expected total crime count that is roughly twice that of 
blocks mixing in residential uses. Single-use commercially zoned blocks 
have expected crime counts that are approximately forty-five percent higher 
than blocks with residential uses mixed in. Contrary to some predictions 
from urban planning theory, which suggest that mixed–land use zoning will 
 
187 Both regression models include fixed effects for Community Plan Areas. The count  
multiplier or incidence rate ratios are displayed, along with ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
in parentheses. We also estimated the models in Table 3 using robust standard errors to adjust for 
over dispersion. See supra note 185. “Total” crime represents the sum of homicide, rape, assault, 
robbery, theft, theft from automobile, burglary, and auto theft. 
188 Because only four blocks are zoned for manufacturing, they are included with commercially-
zoned blocks for a total of twenty-six blocks in the analysis.  
189 Model 2 is defined as: Crimeia = μ + ßResidentiali + ΨCommercial-Singlei + λCommercial- 
Multiplei + δAreasa + sia. 
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reduce crime, blocks with a single type of residential zoning have the lowest 
level of crime.  
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Effect of Refined Zoning Classifications on Crime190 
100 meters Total Assault Robbery Theft Burglary 
Auto 
Theft 
Single 
Residential 
0.52 * 
(.44-.61) 
0.70* 
(.47-1.05) 
0.31* 
(.20-.46) 
0.46* 
(.31-.70) 
0.56* 
(.37-.85) 
0.74 
(.51-1.08) 
Multi-
Commercial 
2.48* 
(2.12-2.90) 
1.71* 
(1.07-2.72) 
1.92*  
(1.36-2.72) 
6.10*  
(4.25-8.54) 
1.21 
(.72-2.05) 
1.79* 
(1.14-2.80) 
Single- 
Commercial 
1.45* 
(1.20-1.75) 
1.50* 
(.92-2.45) 
1.08 
(.70-1.68) 
3.18*  
(2.12-4.76) 
1.27 
(.76-2.13) 
1.22 
(.74-2.01) 
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.25 0.34 0.34 0.25 0.28 
 
250 meters Total Assault Robbery Theft Burglary 
Auto 
Theft 
Single 
Residential 
0.95 
(.88-1.02) 
0.95 
(.79-1.14) 
0.82* 
(.69-.98) 
1.05 
(.88-1.24) 
0.92 
(.77-1.10) 
1.01 
(.83-1.20) 
Multi-
Commercial 
1.97* 
(1.81-2.14) 
1.58* 
(1.22-1.94) 
1.80* 
(1.48-2.20) 
4.25*  
(3.55-5.07) 
1.13 
(.88-1.43) 
1.42* 
(1.13-1.78) 
Single- 
Commercial 
1.47*  
(1.34-1.61) 
1.18  
(.91-1.14) 
1.32* 
(1.04-1.66) 
2.65*  
(2.16-3.24) 
1.10 
(.86-1.42) 
1.20 
(.95-1.52) 
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.41 0.38 
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed); n = 205 blocks. All models include area-level fixed effects. 
 
 
 
 
190 “Total” represents the sum of homicide, rape, assault, robbery, theft, theft from automobile, 
burglary, and auto theft. The count-multiplier or incidence-rate ratios are displayed, along with 
95% confidence intervals in parentheses. We also estimated the models in Table 4 using robust 
standard errors to adjust for overdispersion. See supra note 185. 
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These results are generally consistent with the situational crime preven-
tion literature, which predicts that areas with commercial establishments 
create more attractive crime opportunities.191 According to this theory, 
establishments that attract strangers who are potential offenders or suitable 
criminal targets will increase criminal victimization. Consistent with this 
theory, our results show that, on average, residential-only areas with likely 
fewer strangers have less crime, whereas commercially zoned areas with 
likely more strangers have higher rates of crime. 
Figure 1 below shows the expected total crime counts at 100 meters for 
the different types of zoning. The expected crime counts are substantially 
lower in multiple zoned areas than in single commercially zoned blocks. 
 
Figure 1: Estimated Effect of Zoning on Crime Counts at 100 Meters 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Association Between Zoning Homogeneity and Crime 
Zoning homogeneity refers to the degree to which parcels on a block 
share the same zoning classifications. The concept of zoning homogeneity 
thus complements the Jacobs argument that mixed-use zoning increases the 
“eyes on the street,”192 and to the situational crime prevention literature, 
which argues that multiple-form zoning encourages establishments such as 
 
191 See, e.g., Sherman et al., supra note 146, at 45 tbl.5 (reporting that 36 of the top 42 areas of 
predatory crimes in a study of Minneapolis were nonresidential areas). 
192 See JACOBS, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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bars and restaurants which often produce crime.193 Here, we estimate the 
effect of zoning homogeneity of crime within 100 and 250 meters of the 
street blocks in the study. 
We measure zoning homogeneity with the Herfindahl index of the two 
most common types of zoning on each block.194 A lower Herfindahl index 
indicates less homogeneity in zoning types on the block. A block with only 
one kind of zoning has an index score of one while a block with many 
different kinds of zoning has an index score between zero and one, with a 
lower score indicating more types of zoning on the block. 
Table 5 below presents our estimates of the effect of zoning homogeneity 
on crime.195 Zoning homogeneity is consistently associated with lower crime 
at both 100 and 250 meter distances. Increasing the homogeneity of zoning 
is associated with a 73% reduction in the predicted count of all crimes at the 
100-meter range.196 The effect of zoning homogeneity diminishes as the range 
expands to 250 meters. 
 
 
 
193 See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.  
194 We calculate the Herfindahl index as the sum of squares of the proportion of parcels for 
the two most common land use classifications on each block. See Stephen A. Rhoades, The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 188, 188-89 (1993) (defining the index). The 
mean of the Herfindahl index for the 205 blocks in the study is 0.77, and the standard deviation is 
0.23. The Herfindahl index for the blocks in the study range from 0.22 to 1.0. 
195 Model 3 is as follows: Crimeia = μ + ßΣpi2+ δAreasa + sia, where Σpi2 represents the  
Herfindahl index for each block i. 
196 We also estimated models in Table 5 using robust standard errors to adjust for over-
dispersion. See supra note 185. This has no influence on the size of our estimates, but expands the 
standard errors making most of the results no longer significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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Table 5: Estimated Effect of Zoning Homogeneity on Crime197 
100 meters Total Assault Robbery Theft Burglary 
Auto 
Theft 
Homogeneity 0.26* 
(.21-.34) 
0.49* 
(.26- .93) 
0.38* 
(.22-.67) 
0.06* 
(.03- .11) 
0.50* 
(.25-1.01) 
0.55** 
(.29- 1.02) 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.26 
 
250 meters Total Assault Robbery Theft Burglary 
Auto 
Theft 
Homogeneity 0.81* 
(.72-.92) 
0.92 
(.67-1.27) 
1.00 
(.75-1.35) 
0.50* 
(.39-.64) 
1.31** 
(.95-1.81) 
1.14 
(.85-1.54) 
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.29 0.32 0.21 0.41 0.37 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.10 (two-tailed); n = 205 blocks. All models include area-level fixed 
effects. 
 
 
It is possible these results are simply driven by the lower crime rates on 
purely residential blocks which make up nearly half (n = 99) of the blocks in 
the study. In order to test that hypothesis, we repeat the analysis and 
include interaction terms between the Herfindahl index, and each of the 
zoning classifications.198 We find nearly identical effects: zoning homogeneity 
is associated with lower predicted crime counts in residential, commercial, 
and mixed zoned areas. The effects are largest in residential areas. This 
suggests that the results in Table 5 are not merely driven by lower crime in 
uniformly residential areas. Rather, even among blocks with the same 
zoning classification, homogeneity is associated with lower crime. Figure 2 
below displays this relationship by graphing the expected crime rate for 
residential zones, and other zones by zoning homogeneity.  
 
 
197 Zoning homogeneity is measured by the Herfindahl index from the sum of squares of the 
proportion of parcels for the two primary classifications on each block. See supra note 194. All 
regressions include area fixed effects. The count multiplier or incidence rate ratios are displayed 
along with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. “Total” represents the sum of homicide, rape, 
assault, robbery, theft, theft from automobile, burglary, and auto theft. 
198 The results of this regression are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 2: Predicted Crimes by Zoning Homogeneity199 
 
 
 
Land use homogeneity may reduce crime in residential areas by reducing 
street traffic, or in commercial areas by producing dominant business patterns 
that reduce opportunities for crime. This theory is generally consistent with 
the situational crime prevention literature.200 
Our empirical results suggest that zoning has a substantial effect on 
crime. However, these results do not suggest a precise mechanism.201 We 
turn to that question next. 
 
199 Zoning homogeneity is measured by the Herfindahl index. See supra note 194. This figure 
plots predicted crime with a fractional polynomial smoother to display nonlinearity.  
200 See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. 
201 Since we observe only certain blocks within a neighborhood, it is possible that the reduc-
tion in crime we observe is accompanied by a rise in crime elsewhere. In other words, it is possible 
that zoning adjustments displace crime, rather than reduce it citywide. However, studies of local 
crime prevention strategies suggest that displacement seldom occurs. A review of 102 situational 
crime prevention evaluations reported that crime displacement is about as likely as its opposite, 
the diffusion of crime prevention benefits. Rob T. Guerette & Kate J. Bowers, Assessing the Extent of 
Crime Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits: A Review of Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations, 47 
CRIMINOLOGY 1331, 1356-57 (2009). The review also found that, when displacement was 
observed, it was smaller than the direct effect of the intervention itself. Id. 
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3. The Association between Zoning and the Built Environment 
Many scholars have hypothesized that the built environment plays an 
important role in affecting crime.202 In order to understand how the built 
environment mediates the relationship between zoning and crime, we 
model our measures of the built environment on zoning classifications.203 
Mixed-use serves as the reference category. Table 6 below provides the 
results from six different models, one for each of the built-environment 
measures. The table indicates the average score for the built environment 
measures across zoning classifications. For example, blocks that are zoned 
for one residential purpose exhibit a 15% lower score of general condition 
than mixed-purpose blocks.204 Since the different built environment measures 
are scaled differently, one cannot directly compare the scores between 
different built environment measures (between columns). 
The R-squared reports the percentage of variation in each of the built-
environment measures explained by zoning classification and area-level 
fixed effects. Zoning explains a larger share of the variation in general 
condition, surveillance, crime attractors, and walk score,  than it does in 
disorder and territoriality. 
Zoning for multiple commercial uses is more strongly correlated with 
natural surveillance than is zoning for a single commercial zoned block. 
Multiple- and single-commercial use zoning are correlated with more crime 
attractors, such as liquor stores and bars, whereas residential-only zoning is 
correlated with fewer crime attractors. Commercially zoned blocks have 
higher values of walkability. These findings suggest some potential mecha-
nisms through which zoning influences features of the built environment 
that correlate with crime. 
 
202 See supra Section II.A. 
203 Model 4 is defined as follows: Built Environmentia = μ + ßResidentiali + ΨCommercial-
Singlei + λCommercial-Multiplei + δAreas a + sia. 
204 This can be calculated by dividing the coefficient (-1.42) by the sample mean (9.33). 
  
2013] Reducing Crime With Zoning 743 
 
Table 6: Estimated Effect of Zoning Classifications on  
Built Environment Measures205 
 
 General 
Condition 
Disorder Territoriality Surveillance 
Crime 
Attractors 
Walk Score 
Single Residential 
-1.42* 
(.345) 
-.28
(.32) 
.04
(.12) 
.34
(.343) 
-.31*
(.12) 
-2.07 
(2.03) 
Multi-Commercial 
0.85 
(.547) 
0.79
(.51) 
.19
(.195) 
-1.96*
(.54) 
.43*
(.19) 
11.07* 
(3.22) 
Single-Commercial 
0.66 
(.553) 
0.39
(.51) 
-.03
(.197) 
-3.45*
(.54) 
1.36*
(.192) 
10.06* 
(3.25) 
R2 0.30 0.17 0.08 0.34 0.34 0.37 
Sample Mean (SD) 
9.33 
(2.42) 
8.62
(2.08) 
8.43
(.75) 
13.39
(2.48) 
.40
(.87) 
67.69 
(15.14) 
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed); n = 205 blocks. All models include area-level fixed effects. 
 
We turn now to the effect of zoning homogeneity on the built environ-
ment. Table 7 below presents our estimates of the effect of zoning homoge-
neity on our measures of the built environment.206 The R-squared figures 
indicate that, with the exception of walk score, zoning homogeneity explains 
very little variation in the built environment measures, suggesting that 
zoning homogeneity is only weakly related to our built environment scores. 
Zoning homogeneity is associated with inferior general block conditions 
(e.g., quality of streets, sidewalks, and buildings), higher natural surveil-
lance, and lower walkability. The negative association between homogeneity 
and walkability is best explained by the greater distance from homogeneous-
ly zoned blocks to business establishments, schools, and parks, which 
provide walking destinations. Overall, these results for zoning homogeneity 
are consistent with the results from our analysis of the effect of zoning 
classification on the built environment (in Table 6).207 
 
 
205 Standard errors are noted in parentheses. We also estimated models in Table 6 using 
robust standard errors to adjust for overdispersion. See supra note 185. This has no influence on the 
size of our estimates, but the standard errors expand making the results for multiple commercial 
zoning no longer significantly related to crime attractors at the p < 0.05 level. 
206 Model 5 is defined as follows: Built Environmentia = μ + ßΣpi2 + δAreasa + sia. 
207 The percentage of variation is lower in these models, however. We also estimated the 
models in Table 7 using robust standard errors to adjust for over dispersion. See supra note 194. In 
this analysis, the standard errors expanded, but the significance levels did not change substantively. 
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Table 7: Estimated Effect of Zoning Homogeneity on Built Environment208 
 
 General 
Condition 
Disorder Territorial Surveillance 
Crime 
Attractors 
Walk Score 
Homogeneity209 -1.76* 
(.682) 
-.605
(.606) 
-.004
(.229) 
1.37**
(.727) 
-.10
(.268) 
-8.71* 
(3.98) 
R2 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.30 
Sample Mean 
(SD) 
9.33 
(2.42) 
8.62
(2.08) 
8.43
(.75) 
13.39
(2.48) 
.40
(.87) 
67.69 
(15.14) 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.10 (two-tailed); n = 205 blocks. All models include area-level fixed 
effects. 
 
4. The Built Environment as a Mediator for the Association 
 Between Land Use and Crime  
We next consider questions with important policy implications: How 
much variation in crime is predicted by land use zoning if we assume that 
zoning affects crime only through its effects on the built environment? Why 
is this important for policy? If a sufficient share of crime is predicted by the 
effects of zoning on the built environment, we could imagine zoning these 
blocks to be more mixed by adding residential parcels to the blocks. 
To measure the effect of zoning on crime through the built environ-
ment, we use the predicted built environment scores from Table 6. We then 
compute the correlation between crime and the predicted built environment 
values from zoning classifications.210 The results indicate the theoretical 
average crime rate on the blocks in our study were expected built environ-
ment scores based on zoning classifications.  
By using the built environment scores that are predicted by zoning rather 
than the actual built environment scores, we diminish the risk of endogeneity—
the possibility that the relationship observed is the result of crime affecting 
the built environment rather than the built environment affecting crime. 
Because the built environment score we use is predicted by zoning and zoning 
is much less likely to be affected by crime than the built environment, we 
 
208 Standard errors are noted in parentheses.  
209 Zoning homogeneity is measured by the Herfindahl index. See supra note 185. 
210 We specifically rely on each block’s predicted built environment measure (estimated from 
zoning classifications and controlling for the area of Los Angeles) to predict the crime rate. This 
assures that the correlation between the built environment measure and crime is at least a partial 
function of the zoning classifications, thereby reducing the influence of endogeneity.  
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minimize this risk.211 A strong association between the predicted built 
environment score and crime would provide plausible evidence that zoning 
affects crime through its effect on the built environment.  
Table 8 below shows the estimated effects of the built environment on 
crime, as predicted by zoning classifications. 212  The built-environment 
measures, as predicted by zoning classification, are correlated with crime.213 
If one controls for zoning, for example, blocks with higher walk scores have 
slightly lower expected crime counts in the adjacent area. Areas predicted 
by zoning classification to have higher disorder are associated with higher 
crime counts of all forms—with increases ranging from 1.5 to 2.8 times the 
base level. Blocks that are predicted to have a higher presence of crime 
attractors are associated with higher crime as well.  
Contrary to expectations, however, the predicted general condition and 
territoriality of blocks are associated with higher expected crime rates. One 
explanation for this counterintuitive finding is that the results from our 
model predicting built environment measures in Table 6 showed that 
zoning itself explained relatively little variation in general condition and 
territoriality. This suggests that the physical conditions of roadways, side-
walks, and buildings are not largely determined by zoning differences 
within the same areas of Los Angeles. In other words, the general condition 
of blocks does not vary greatly within areas across zoning classifications.  
 
211 Our measures of the built environment are likely to be more sensitive to crime than  
zoning. The general condition of the block, for example, will be affected if crime drives out 
residents and businesses that maintain the block. Similarly, our measures of physical disorder are 
likely to be affected by a similar dynamic. See TAYLOR, supra note 125, at 171 (finding that crime 
causes subsequent disorder). Because a change in formal zoning requires a legal process, which 
takes time, effort, and money, it is less likely to be directly affected by crime.  
212 Table 8 is a model of the partial correlation of the endogenous built-environment variables 
on crime, developed by their predicted levels from the zoning classifications. There are separate 
models for each row in Table 8, as each model has the same set of predictors. These are simply 
descriptive models, as the directions of the pathways were imposed and the correlations in errors 
between models were assumed to be independent, which are strong assumptions for this set of 
structural equation models. We also estimated these models with robust standard errors. See supra 
note 185. In this analysis, the coefficients for predicted territorial levels were no longer significant 
at the p < 0.05 level for total crime, robbery, theft, or auto theft. The coefficient for the predicted 
value of surveillance was no longer significantly correlated at the p < 0.05 level with total crime. 
The coefficients for predicted level of crime attractors were no longer significant at the p < 0.05 
level for assault, burglary, and auto theft. The coefficients on the predicted walk scores were also 
no longer statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level for total crime and robbery.  
213 The results are substantively similar when estimated at the 250-meter range. 
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Table 8: Effects of Built Environment on Crime as Predicted 
 by Zoning Classifications at 100 meters214 
 
 
Total Assault Robbery Theft Burglary 
Auto 
Theft 
General 
Condition 
1.58* 
(.037) 
1.52* 
(.094) 
1.85* 
(.107) 
1.61* 
(.082) 
1.49* 
(.10) 
1.44* 
(.085) 
Disorder 2.07* (.068) 
2.09* 
(.185) 
2.13* 
(.166) 
2.89* 
(.213) 
1.71* 
(.162) 
1.78* 
(.151) 
Territorial 3.21* (.437) 
2.67* 
(.965) 
4.04* 
(1.30) 
5.34* 
(1.57) 
1.47 
(.572) 
2.63* 
(.920) 
Surveillance 0.90* (.017) 
0.98 
(.054) 
0.92 
(.042) 
0.79* 
(.02) 
0.94 
(.054) 
0.97 
(.050) 
Attractors 1.66* (.080) 
1.41* 
(.193) 
1.72* 
(.194) 
2.17* 
(.208) 
1.52* 
(.218) 
1.35* 
(.181) 
Walk score 0.97* (.003) 
0.95* 
(.009) 
0.98* 
(.007) 
1.00 
(.006) 
0.93* 
(.010) 
0.94* 
(.009) 
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed); n = 205 blocks. 
 
Taken as a whole, the findings across all of our analyses suggest that 
increasing surveillance, reducing crime attractors, and increasing walkability 
through zoning changes could substantially influence the crime rates on city 
blocks in Los Angeles. 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF  
ZONING CHANGES ON CRIME 
Up to this point, we have only inferred a relationship between zoning 
and crime through a research design that compares crime rates and the built 
environment across 205 blocks with different land use designations in the 
same areas of Los Angeles. This methodology is limited because we cannot 
observe how, if at all, zoning directly influences crime. In other words, our 
observations take place long after zoning designations were established in 
these blocks.  
Another approach to determine whether zoning affects crime is to  
observe changes in the crime rate in an area before and after a zoning 
change occurs, and to compare crime in this area with crime in comparable 
 
214 The count-multiplier or incidence-rate ratios are displayed. Standard errors are noted in 
parentheses. Each column in the table reflects a separate model of predicted built environment 
measure on crime. Coefficients are in linear form. “Total” represents the sum of homicide, rape, 
assault, robbery, theft, theft from automobile, burglary, and auto theft. 
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areas that did not undergo a zoning change.215 In this way, we can attempt 
to observe the following counter-factual: what would have happened to 
crime absent the zoning change? This second study complements our first. 
While we do not have the kind of rich built-environment observational data 
in this study that was available in the first study, we do have a substantially 
larger sample size. We also have crime data over a considerable period of 
time, which helps identify comparable neighborhoods with similar crime 
trends before zoning changes. 
 A. Data 
We obtained detailed data on the zoning designation of every parcel in 
Los Angeles for the years 2006, 2008, and 2010.216 From this data we were 
able to identify all 361 parcels that changed zoning designations between 
2006 and 2010.217 Eighty-four percent (n = 304) of the zoning changes took 
place in 2008. The single largest category of zoning changes represented 
transfers to residential-multiple use (n = 107), which accounted for approxi-
mately thirty percent of all zoning changes. The second largest category 
represented zoning changes to commercial zoning use (n = 83). The most 
common form of original designation (i.e., before change) was other uses  
(n = 201).  
The 361 affected parcels are located within 180 LAPD reporting districts, 
which were created to correspond closely to neighborhoods in Los Angeles.218 
Roughly 18% (n = 180) of 1010 neighborhoods with a zoning designation had 
at least one zoning change on a parcel of land between 2006 and 2010.219 We 
 
215 The ideal research design would randomize zoning in comparable geographic areas and 
track the results over time. A randomized field experiment of this kind, however, is not feasible in 
cities like Los Angeles where zoning decisions are made through a series of regulated legal policy 
steps. 
216 We obtained the zoning data, which serves as the primary independent variable in our 
analysis, from the City of Los Angeles, Department of City Planning. See ZIMAS, supra note 170. 
We use our Los Angeles crime data from 2006 to 2010 for the outcome variable. 
217 The zoning data has one important limitation: it indicates only whether a parcel under-
went a zoning change, but does not indicate the kind of change in actual land use. 
218 Cook & MacDonald, supra note 148, at 450. Reporting districts are the smallest geographic 
unit for which crime records are available going back to 1994. “Reporting districts occupy more 
territory in areas where the residential population and housing density is lower. The number of 
crimes or arrests per reporting district is effectively a rate per unit of resident population in more 
residential areas.” Id. Hereinafter, we refer to reporting districts as “neighborhoods.” 
219 Reporting district maps from 2005 were used to maintain consistency in boundaries. In 
2008 the LAPD changed its boundaries for several reporting districts and added a new police 
division. We excluded two reporting districts that had no land-use zoning on them.  
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aggregated our parcel data to the neighborhood-level crime data.220 We 
focused on the felony offenses of robbery, assault, burglary, theft from 
automobiles, and auto theft because these crimes are more likely than others 
to occur in public settings and are thus more likely to be affected by changes 
in zoning.  
 B. Results 
To measure the effect of zoning changes in this study, we needed to 
construct a comparison group of neighborhoods that is similar to the 
neighborhoods that underwent a zoning change during the study period. To 
minimize the chance that our comparison neighborhoods were materially 
different from our zoning-change neighborhoods, we constructed a compari-
son group based on historical crime trends for the twelve-year period 
preceding 2006 (1994–2005). Constructing a comparison group based upon 
historical crime trends allowed us to control for potential confounding 
variables that we could not observe with the data available to us. We used 
twelve years of crime data to maximize the comparability of zoning change 
and comparison neighborhoods on historic crime trends.  
We use group-based modeling of trajectories221 to identify groups of 
neighborhoods that share similar historical crime trends between 1994 and 
 
220 Because we have crime data only at the neighborhood level, we cannot separate out each 
of the 361 zoning amendments for individual sub-analyses. However, since we are estimating an 
effect for an entire neighborhood off of a limited number of parcels, our test is biased toward 
finding no effect. 
221 See generally DANIEL S. NAGIN, GROUP-BASED MODELING OF DEVELOPMENT 23-
44 (2005) (explaining that group-based trajectory modeling predicts each group’s development and 
“the probability that a randomly chosen individual from the sampled population is a member of 
each such group”). The model for each group trajectory takes the following form:  
Crime jrt
 = μ + ßtimejrt + Ψtime2 jrt + λtime3 jrt +s jrt.  
The mean rate of crime for each group j comprising the LAPD reporting districts is modeled as 
following up to a third-order polynomial in time, where Crimer is a vector of individual reporting 
district r’s levels of crime at each yearly time point conditional on membership in group j, and 
time, time2, and time3, are the powers of r’s yearly time points. Given the potential for heterogeneity 
in the crime patterns, we allowed the trajectories to vary according to this polynomial form to 
maximize flexibility in the crime trajectories (though this has little consequence since the average 
crime rate is declining over most of the observational period). Because we are interested in 
identifying a distinct group of police reporting districts that had zoning changes with those that 
did not but have similar pre-crime trajectories, this outcome is modeled as a mixture of distribu-
tions as shown in the likelihood equation below: 
 P(Crimert) = ∑rπj Πt p j (Crimer) 
Crimer represents a reporting district r’s vector of crime rates over years 1994 to 2005 (t), 
p j(Crimer) is the probability of crime rates for each neighborhood given membership in group j and 
π is the population probability of membership in group j. The model assumes that, conditional on  
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2005.222 In Figure 3 below we show the average crime rate during that 
period for the four trajectory groups identified by our model.223 With the 
exception of the years 1999 to 2001, all groups were declining in crime 
regardless of their overall rate.  
 
Figure 3: Trajectories after Sorting Areas into Highest Group Probability 
 
 
 
 
group membership j, the measurements for each individual reporting district r at each time point 
are independent. To identify the optimal number of trajectory groups we used the Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC). This is necessary because when an additional trajectory group is 
included the parameters have different meanings. The model also provides estimates of the 
proportion of this population that follows each trajectory and posterior probabilities of group 
membership for each individual reporting district. The parameters of this model are estimated by 
a direct maximum likelihood procedure assuming normal distributions available in SAS. For a 
description of this procedure, see Bobby L. Jones, Daniel S. Nagin & Kathryn Roeder, A SAS 
Procedure Based on Mixture Models for Estimating Developmental Trajectories, 29 SOC. METHODS & 
RES. 374 (2001). 
222 For parsimony, we compare historical crime trends among neighborhoods using total 
reported felony crimes, defined as the sum of homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, theft from 
automobiles, and auto theft. We excluded other forms of theft that were not uniformly defined 
during the 1994 to 2005 period. 
223 Neighborhoods were categorized into their trajectory group based upon the highest prob-
ability of group membership estimated by the model. 
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Next, we fit a propensity score model on all neighborhoods to estimate 
the probability that a neighborhood had a zoning change conditional on the 
four trajectory group membership probabilities and on the nineteen regions 
of Los Angeles in which the neighborhood is located.224 Based on the 
propensity score values, we re-weight comparison neighborhoods225 so that 
the distribution of covariates for comparison neighborhoods matches the 
distribution of covariates among neighborhoods that experienced a zoning 
change. This approach gives greater weight to comparison neighborhoods 
with crime trajectories from 1994 to 2005 that are similar to zoning change 
neighborhoods and are in the same regions of the city.226 Weighting by 
propensity score adjusts for the potential confounding effect of differences 
in preexisting crime trends that could be correlated with changes in zoning 
between 2006 and 2010. After weighting on the propensity score, we have 
an effective sample size of 956 neighborhoods in the analysis.227  
 Table 9 below shows the standardized differences in trajectory means 
before and after matching on the propensity score weights. There are 
average differences in the mean probability of membership in different 
trajectory groups before matching, but these differences shrink substantially 
after applying the propensity score weights.228 Table 9 demonstrates that 
the propensity scores effectively weight comparison neighborhoods so that 
they are comparable to zoning change neighborhoods. 
 
224 For a similar example using propensity scores, see Amelia Haviland, Daniel S. Nagin & 
Paul Rosenbaum, Combining Propensity Score Matching and Group-Based Trajectory Analysis in an 
Observational Study, 12 PSYCHOL. METHODS 247 (2007). See also id. at 250-59 (combining group-
based trajectory modeling with a similar kind of propensity score model, but matching on 
propensity score rather than weighting on propensity score as we do here). Regions are defined by 
LAPD divisions: nineteen unique geographic boundaries that represent semi-autonomous areas for 
which police allocation and planning decisions are made. By including these larger police divisions 
as geographic controls, we adjust for the average level of crime in different geographic regions.  
225 Neighborhoods receiving the zoning change received weights equal to 1; whereas neigh-
borhoods not receiving any zoning change receive inverse probability weights (IPW) equal to  
p/1 – p, according to their propensity score. These IPW values up-weight cases for comparison 
neighborhoods that have comparable preexisting crime trajectories and are from the same regions 
of Los Angeles. We lose two reporting districts in the analysis because they had zero crimes 
reported between 1994 and 2005 and do not contribute to the trajectory model.  
226 See Daniel F. McCaffrey et al., Propensity Score Estimation with Boosted Regression for Eval-
uating Causal Effects in Observational Studies, 9 PSYCHOL. METHODS 403, 405-07 (2004) 
(describing the analytic technique of propensity score weighting).  
227 More specifically, we have 180 neighborhoods that received a zoning change between 
2006 and 2010 and a weighted sample of 776 comparison neighborhoods. In effect, we lose the 
equivalent of 54 neighborhoods through this strategy because no parcels in the LAPD Southwest 
Division underwent a zoning change. 
228 All mean differences are no longer statistically significant (p < 0.05) after balancing on 
the propensity score weights. 
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Table 9: Difference Before and After Weighting on the Probability of  
Trajectory Groups and Regions of City229 
 
 
Zoned Change 
(n = 180) 
Comparison 
Unweighted 
(n = 830) 
Comparison 
Weighted 
(n = 776) 
Dx Dxm 
Group 1 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.17 0.05 
Group 2 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.08 0.04 
Group 3 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.02 
Group 4 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.01 
 
After equalizing zoning change neighborhoods and comparison neigh-
borhoods on historical crime trajectory and region of Los Angeles, we 
estimated the effect of zoning changes on crime.230 The results of the 
analysis, presented in Table 10 below, show that neighborhoods experience 
substantial reductions in total crime after the introduction of a zoning 
change. A zoning change is associated with an average of 7.31 fewer crimes 
per year in a neighborhood. Interpreting this estimate at the sample mean 
of 99.5 per year crimes suggests that there are approximately seven percent 
fewer crimes in neighborhoods associated with a zoning change. Although 
the analysis reveals that assault, robbery, and burglary numbers are lower on 
average after a zoning change, these effects are not statistically significant. 
Rather, the effect on total crime appears to be driven mostly by reductions 
in theft from automobiles and stolen cars. On average, there is roughly a 
seven-percent reduction in thefts from automobiles and an eleven-percent 
reduction in stolen motor vehicles among neighborhoods that received some 
zoning change. Given that most of the zoning changes in the study are 
conversions to residential uses, these findings suggest that substantial 
changes in crimes of opportunity take place on the streets as neighborhoods 
become more residential.  
 
 
229 Dx represents the mean-standardized difference before weighting on propensity score. 
Dxm represents the mean-standardized difference after weighting on propensity score. 
230 Model 6 is defined as follows: 
Crimert = µ + βPost Changert + Ψt + λr + srt. 
Crime denotes the crime rate for the neighborhood r at time t (2006–2010), Post Change is an 
indicator variable that equals one if neighborhood r is in the zoning change group starting in year 
2008 or 2010. The parameters Ψ and λ represent fixed-effect parameters (dummy variables) to 
control for year and neighborhood trends. The parameter β indicates the effect of a zoning change. 
Eighty-nine percent (n = 161) of the 180 reporting districts that had a zoning change occurred in 2008 
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Table 10: Estimated Effect of Zoning Change on Crime in Neighborhoods231 
 
Crime Total Assault Robbery Theft-
from-Auto 
Burglary Auto 
Theft 
Zoning 
Change 
-7.31* 
(3.59) 
-1.81 
(1.39) 
-0.81 
(.48) 
-2.08** 
(1.91) 
-0.23 
(.69) 
-2.28* 
(0.98) 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.10 (two-tailed); n = 4766 police reporting districts.  
 
These findings confirm our earlier block-level results.232 We see strong 
associations between crime and the changes in zoning designations, suggesting 
that implementing a zoning change has some fundamental bearing on crime 
patterns. Clearly, this is not simply an effect of switching the law but rather 
a consequence of changes in land usage afterwards. Because the zoning 
changes have to occur before the land use changes, zoning enactments 
appear to have a meaningful impact on crime and are not merely a conse-
quence of existing land use patterns.  
 V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this Part, we briefly discuss the implications of our findings for policy-
makers and the existing literature.  
First, we find that zoning is substantially associated with crime rates. 
This correlation suggests that both researchers and policymakers should pay 
more attention to the ways in which zoning and other land use policies can 
affect crime, because even a modest reduction in crime can justify signifi-
cant up-front research and planning costs.233 While we offer some tentative 
conclusions, our firmest recommendation is that this relationship should be 
studied in more depth. 
Second, we find that residential zoning is associated with substantially 
lower crime than commercial zoning or mixed-use zoning. Our work echoes 
past studies that make similar findings about actual land use (as opposed to 
zoning). However, the higher crime associated with mixed-use zoning has 
 
231 All models include year and reporting district fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for 
959 police reporting district clusters. “Total” represents the sum of homicide, rape, assault, 
robbery, theft from automobile, burglary, and auto theft. 
232 See supra Section III.C. 
233  See PAUL HEATON, RAND CTR. ON QUALITY POLICING, HIDDEN IN PLAIN 
SIGHT: WHAT COST OF CRIME RESEARCH CAN TELL US ABOUT INVESTING IN POLICE 
4-7 (2010) (summarizing the cost-of-crime literature and the substantial costs associated with 
criminal activity). 
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not always been acknowledged by its proponents.234 Logic supports the 
intuition that commercial uses will deter crime by increasing the “eyes on 
the street,”235 and commercial and mixed zoning might seem particularly 
promising for reducing crimes in high-crime neighborhoods. Yet, consistent 
with prior studies, our research refutes this common-sense notion. Though 
it may seem logical that mixed-use zoning would reduce crime as compared 
to housing that is uniformly residential, our research shows that even in 
relatively high-crime Los Angeles neighborhoods, blocks with commercial 
uses have more reported crime than those that are uniformly residential. 
Third, though mixed-use blocks have more reported crime than uni-
formly residential blocks, they have substantially less reported crime than 
commercial blocks. This difference suggests that changing commercially 
zoned areas to residential zoning may be an effective crime-reduction 
strategy. Despite Jacobs’s hypothesis that commercial establishments reduce 
crime in residential areas,236 the converse appears to be true: residential 
parcels seem to reduce crime in commercial areas. The results of both of our 
empirical studies are consistent with this story. In our second study, we 
found that the decrease in crime associated with zoning changes is predom-
inately correlated with a decrease in thefts of and from automobiles rather 
than more serious forms of crime. Though these crimes of opportunity are 
important to reduce, why these crimes show such reduction is unclear, so 
one should use caution in interpreting these results. 
Fourth, our results may also have implications for tax policy. Our findings, 
using a slightly different methodology, replicate previous findings that 
commercial areas are responsible for more crime than other areas. Therefore, 
taxing commercial zones at substantially higher rates to compensate for this 
externality imposed on the neighborhood may be efficient. Alternatively, 
policies that encourage business improvement districts (which can be seen as 
a local tax) may also be warranted to reduce crime associated with commer-
cial areas.237 
The results of our analysis also have implications for the research litera-
ture associated with several of the built environment constructs discussed in 
Part II. With respect to natural surveillance, we find no support for Jacobs’s 
argument that commercial uses will reduce crime by encouraging a robust 
 
234 See Garnett, The People Paradox, supra note 3, at 50-60; see also ZELINKA & BRENNAN, supra 
note 61, at 53-54 (”Diversity of land uses . . . can help create safer and stronger neighborhoods.”). 
235 See JACOBS, supra note 12. 
236 See id. at 36. 
237 See MacDonald et al., supra note 148, at 329-30 (finding that business improvement districts 
reduce violent crimes, especially robbery). 
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street life and “eyes on the street.”238 Consistent with previous studies of 
land use, we find that commercial zoning is generally associated with 
increased crime. Our study contributes to the literature by replicating this 
finding in a different city and by employing a more rigorous empirical 
methodology. 
In contrast to this more macro theory of natural surveillance, other 
scholars have posited that more micro-level interventions that increase 
visibility will reduce crime. We observed fairly modest support for this 
theory, finding that blocks with higher predicted levels of natural surveil-
lance had slightly lower crime. However, our study is limited because our 
ability to measure variations in natural surveillance was limited. Designing 
streets to have better natural surveillance could lead to crime prevention 
benefits, but such designs would require a more specific set of zoning 
regulations than are apparent through our study design.  
Numerous writers, probably beginning with Jacobs, have noted the  
importance of territoriality, or the clear demarcation of space, and a sizeable 
empirical literature finds that less permeable spaces are associated with 
lower crime.239 Because our study was block-based, we focused on more 
micro-level measures of territoriality, looking at flowerboxes, flags, and 
well-tended yards. Perhaps because these measures were associated with 
commercial uses, we found that greater territoriality is associated with 
greater crime. 
Our study also offers some empirical findings for the sizable literature 
on physical disorder or incivilities.240 Our study focused purely on observed 
physical disorder, finding that blocks with substantial physical disorder have 
more crime. Because we used physical disorder predicted by zoning rather 
than actual physical disorder, we have some confidence that the direction of 
the causal arrow is from disorder to crime rather than the reverse. 
Finally, our findings provide substantial support for a relationship be-
tween crime and certain crime attracting land uses. Our measure of crime 
attraction, as predicted by zoning, was directly associated with crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Since King Edward I, commentators have proposed reducing crime by 
shaping the built environment to reduce opportunities to commit crime. 
The attractions of this idea are considerable—by reducing crime opportunities 
 
238 See JACOBS, supra note 12, at 35. 
239 See supra Section II.D. 
240 See supra Section II.E. 
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at their source, one completely sidesteps the expensive and sometimes 
ineffective criminal justice system. Urban planners and criminologists have 
developed a rich literature in this field. Much of it, however, is methodolog-
ically limited, and with a few notable exceptions, legal academics have paid 
only limited attention to this body of research.  
In this Article, we reviewed the literature and tested a variety of hypotheses 
about the relationship between zoning, the built environment, and crime. 
We found that a significant fraction of reported crime is associated with 
observable indicators of the built environment related to territoriality, 
surveillance, and walkability. Put simply, areas with mixed-use zoning have 
lower reported crime rates than areas zoned for commercial uses only. We 
also found that exclusively residential blocks exhibit lower reported crime 
than blocks zoned for commercial or mixed-use, even in relatively high 
crime neighborhoods.  
In the second part of our empirical study, we examined the association 
between zoning changes and reported crime at the neighborhood level. We 
found that zoning changes—which were mostly conversions to residential 
dwellings in commercial- or other use–zoned areas—were associated with 
reductions in crimes, even when we accounted for historical crime trajectories 
of neighborhoods.  
Together, these findings provide evidence to support the surprisingly 
prescient intuitions expressed in early prozoning judicial opinions about the 
effect of commercial establishments in attracting crime. They also suggest 
that Jacobs had it backwards; rather than commercial uses reducing crime in 
residential areas we found the converse to be true—residential parcels 
appear to reduce crime in commercial areas. 
Looking forward, our findings suggest that strategic decisions about zoning 
could be part of the overall crime prevention strategy. In theory, reduced 
crime will lead to a variety of positive social welfare outcomes, including 
increased community efficacy, reduced fear of crime, increased outdoor 
exercise, and better long-term health outcomes. 
Despite these promising findings, caution and more research are surely 
appropriate. We view our findings as tentative first steps in a new field 
rather than as conclusive answers. Jacobs argued that the appropriate design 
of urban areas will have a wide range of salutary effects on health and safety. 
It is therefore worth noting that she herself cautioned against excesses in 
such thinking: 
[T]here is no direct, simple relationship between good housing and good 
behavior, a fact which the whole tale of the Western world’s history, the 
whole collection of our literature, and the whole fund of observation open 
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to any of us should long since have made evident. Good shelter is a useful 
good in itself, as shelter. When we try to justify good shelter instead on the 
pretentious ground that it will work social or family miracles we fool our-
selves.241 
In many ways, it is attractive to believe that the physical design of our 
cities can shape our behavior for the better. But as the built environment 
receives increased attention, recognizing the complexity of the urban 
environment—and that one intervention can set off a cascade of unforeseen 
effects—becomes increasingly important.242 Our findings suggest that land 
use law may be a promising means of reducing crime—one that may, in 
theory, lead to a host of positive developments. But more research to 
determine whether our findings are more widely applicable is a critical next 
step to applying an ancient crime control strategy. 
 
 
241 JACOBS, supra note 12, at 113. 
242 See id. at 430-35 (discussing how cities are systems of organized complexity and that past 
urban planning efforts “have consistently mistaken cities as problems of simplicity and disor-
ganized complexity”); cf. Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male 
Youth: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment, 120 Q.J. ECON 87, 90 (2005) 
(finding that moving to a neighborhood with less poverty decreases arrests among girls, but 
increases arrests for boys, at least for property crime). 
